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PREFACE 
This thesis focuses on the opposition in Great Britain to the Brit-
ish involvement in a war in South Africa between 1899-1902. The fact 
emerges that opposition to the foreign policy of the government came 
from several segments of society and for a variety of reasons. It also 
appears evident that this opposition resulted in changes of government 
policy during the war, but most important the faith of the British in 
their political power structure was shaken by the war and would never be 
the same. 
For aid on this paper I gratefully acknowledge the fourth floor 
staff of the University Library and especially the services of the 
Interlibrary Loan Department, for able help in acquiring needed material 
for my study. 
Sincere gratitude ia expressed to Dr. Douglas D. Hale, my chief 
thesi$ adviser. His strong encouragement, guidance, and advice over the 
past $everal months have made it possible for me to make completion of 
this thesis a reality. Thanks is also given to Dr. Homer L. Knight 
whose patience and personal encouragement ·were11ne.edep.. 
I)espite the advice, consultation, and material aid provided, the 
final conclusions and presentation are the work of the author, and as 
such he takes full credit for any errors in fact or historical judgment 
that may appear in this study. 
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CHAPTER I 
NO MORE PARADES 
The death of Queen Victoria in January, 1901, symbolized the main 
watershed in the history of nineteenth-century British imperialism. Up 
to this point, the British imperialist tide had been rushing in all over 
the world, but subsequent to 1901 it began to subside, The word "Imper-
ialis!ll" was seen in newspapers and magazine articles and heard in public 
speeches almost daily during the last years of Victoria's reign. All 
the powers of Europe as well as the United States were involved in de-
fining imperialism or were in the active process of carrying out their 
definition, The years 1898-1902 mark the apogee of imperialistic ef-
forts by the world's leading powers. Although the results of the First 
World War would occasion an expansion in the territory under the sway of 
the B:lt'itish Empire, the popular support of the imperialist idea would 
never again be so potent as it was at the turn of the century. As Wil-
frid Scawen Blunt wrote caustically at the close of the nineteenth cen-
tury, 
'l'he old century is very nearly out, and leaves the world in a 
pretty pass, and the British Empire is playing the devil in 
it as never an empire before on so large a scale ..•. The whole 
White race is reveling openly in violence, as though it had 
never pretenqed to be Christian. -God'· s equal curse on them 
all! So ends the famous nineteentn qentury into which we were 
s.o proud to have been born. 1 
lWUfrid Scawen Blunt, ~ Diaries: Being !!_ Personal Narrative of 
Events 1888-1914 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1921), Pt. I, pp. 375-376. 
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Of all the nations that Blunt castigated, it was Great Britain that 
most closely identified with terms empire, imperial, and imperialism. 
At the turn of the century Great Britain ruled the greatest empire known 
to man. The British Empire increased by 9,631,000 square miles and 
360,646,000 inhabitants between 1878 and 1903. 2 British subjects took 
enormous pride in the fact that such an immense amount of the global map 
was colo:red with the cartographer's red that the "sun never set" on 
British 1:1011. 
During the last twenty-five years of the century there was a great 
deal of searching for a p:roper definition of imperialism. It was the 
Earl of Carnarvon who gave the term a double meaning in a speech at 
Edinburgh in November, 1878. He held that there was a "true" imperial-
ism and a "false" imperialism. False imperialism was the mere increas-
ing o,f the bulk of territory and the multiplication of subjects. It in-
volved militarism, personal rule, and vast standing armies, as exem,pli-
fied by the powers on the Continent, True imperialism, on the other 
hand, solved problems of health, provided education for future self-
government, and gained the loyalty of millions of natives who otherwise 
would never have understood nor shared in benefits of western civiliza-
tion,3 Carnarvon's double definition was received warmly by the press. 
Imperialism, it seemed, could be a virtue or a vice, depending upon 
which side of the English Channel or which side of the English political 
fence you resided, In an effort to avoid the obvious pitfalls of 
2 John A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: George Allen. and 
Unwin Ltd., 1902), p. 16. " 
SAnnual Register: 
the~ 1878 (London: 
! Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad for 
Rivingtons, 1879), pp. 183:TsZ:-:-- - -
3 
Carnarvon's rather tendentious definition, in this study the term im-
peria:lism will be used to mean an aggressive, popularly supported policy 
of expansion for territorial control by the British government at the 
time of the Boer War. 
'The initial impetus for this nineteenth-century empire came in 1875 
when ,Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli purchased shares in the Suez Canal 
Company from Khedive Ismail of Egypt. This provided a backbone which 
linked Great Britain with her possessions in Asia. The application of 
flesh to this skeleta 1 structure began with the acquisition of Cyprus in 
1878, the same year that Lord Carnarvon gave his definition of imperial-
ism. From this point the British moved towards an imperialistic ere-
scendo culminating in the Boer War. The motives for the acquisition of 
these, domains were as varied as the nations and nationalities that were 
added to the imperial fold. Commercial interests, considerations of 
naval power, yellow journalism, the Christian missionary movement, emi-
gration of surplus population, a spirit of adventure, and strategic con-
siderations were but a few of the causative factors involved in building 
the Empire.~ Each of these factors can be seen in operation prior to 
and during the Boer War. 
Out of the war, however, there emerged a changing attitude toward 
empire which was expressed in many ways. EngUsh literatl,lre at the turn 
of the century affords an example of this transformation. The literary 
prophet of imperialism in the nineteenth century was Rudyard Kipling. 
His short stories, poems, and novels filled the imagination of a 
,i,William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1935), Vol. I, pp. 67-100, 
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generation of British youth with the desire to leave their mark on the 
world. The epitome of glorification and justification of Empire was 
Kipling's poem, ''White Man's Burden/' first published in February~ 1899~ 
just eight months before the Beer War began, 
Take up the White Man's burden -
Send forth the best ye breed -
Go bind yoar sons to exile 
To serve your captives' need; 6 
Kipling's friend 9 H. Rider Haggard 9 wrote novels of the Dark Continent 
which immediately became best~·sel:;.ers and in.spired greater interest in 
British activities in Africa. His two best known novels~ King Solomon's 
Mines (1885) and She ~1886~, were pJblished in the very years when large 
gold deposits were discovered in the Witwatersrand of the Transvaal. 
This interest ard pride in empi.re was carried over into the chil-
dren' s textbooks of the time. A histor·y of England popular before World 
War I, attempts to show how the Boers were better off in the Empire: 
The Boers had to admit that they were beaten and to lay down 
their arms ...• As we are never hard on people we have con-
quered, they were treated kindly. and as we have seen sinces 
wisely. Though 1t is a bitter thing for a free people to be 
deprived of their independence there is little doubt that 
they were better cff in the end. 6 
Thus were the glories of empire praised, 
But the generation that grew :1p d~ring this time of highly emotion-
al nationalism was to leave beh1.nd literat .1re that reflected the ap-
proaching demise of imperial enth.1s::...asm Even Kip:ing had his doubts 
6Rudyard Kiplir.g_ A, .Pl::.:::1:s:e. rif K1E1.Jng Y~., ed by '.::. s. Eliot 
(New York. Charles Scribner's Sc'1S, 1943:, p. 136. 
6 Maria Callcntt, Jd~~}~. Artj}uf..'~s Hist~C?E..Y gJ ~nglar.d_ :Lo'1d0n. 
193n, p. 282s as q~i'Jted in Cyr:thia F. Fehrmffr,, "'The My<-h0logy cf Brit-
ish Imperialism 1880 ·1914" :ci,pubhshed Ph.D. dissertdtions University 
of Boston_ 1965:. p. 51. 
about: the permanence of the Empire, as his ''Rec·essional," first pub-
lished in 1897, shows: 
Far-called, our navies melt away; 
On dune and headland sinks the fire: 
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday 
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre! 
Judge of the Nations, spare us yet, 
Lest we forget--lest we forget! 7 
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Kipling spent the winter of 1900 visiting the troops in South Africa and 
helping in the editing of an army newspaper, The visit did not change 
his views on the need for an empire, but he was appalled at the state of 
training the soldiers had received before leaving for South Africa. 
With the publication of the poem, ''The Islanders," he alienated ft'iends 
and r,eaders, but he also made his point: 
Sons of the sheltered city--unmade, unhandled, 
unmeet--
~e pushed them raw to the battle as ye 
picked them raw from the street. 8 
the poet Robert Graves recalls that the Boer War caused "great ten-
Sion at the breakfast table" between his eldest brother and his father. 19 
Grave.s was able to understand this emotionalism when he returned to 
England as one of the wounded during World War I. 
England looked very strange to us returned soldiers. We could 
not understand the war-madness •••. The civilians talked a 
foreign language; and it was newspaper language. I found 
1$erious conversation with my parents all but impossible •10 
And the poet Siegfried Sassoon, a friend of Graves, found no gold, God, 
7 Kipling, ! Choice Ef Kipling Verse, p. 140. 
8 Ibid. , p . 12 9 . 
9Robert Graves, Goodb;xe .!.£ All .'.!..h!! (London: Cassell and Cotnpany 
Ltd., 1929), p. 27. 
loibid., p. 201. 
or gl:ory in the trenches of France which were costing Britain, France 
and Germany a full generation of men: 
But when he'd told his tale, an old man said 
That he'd seen soldiers pass along that hill; 
'Poor silent things, they were the English dead 
Who came to fight in France and got their fill. '11 
This revulsion against the old imperialistic shibboleths can be 
found in novels as well as poetry of the post-1900 era. Ford Mado~ 
6 
Ford, in his tetralogy on Edwardian Britain, paints a picture of a soci-
ety that was disappearing after 1900. Ford's main character, Christo-
pher Tietjins, expresses the feeling in No More Parades. He tells of 
the band playing 'Land of Hope and Glory,' and then the ad-
jutant saying 'There will be no more parades' •.. No more Hope, 
no more Glory, no more parades for you and me any more. Nor 
for the country.la 
George Orwell used his personal background as a former policeman in 
Burma for his anti-imperialist novel Burmese Days. The story revolves 
around the members of a small British garrison at a remote outpost in 
Burma who "sit in Kipling-haunted little Clubs" and slowly decay. 13 In 
less than a generation after the Boer War the first shades of twilight 
had appeared over the British Empire. 
But in its time, the Boer War was supported by a wave of patriotic 
enthusiasm fostered by the popular press and encouraged by the govern-
ment, The Education Act of 1870 had produced a new class of readers 
with short memories and sensationalist appetites, The press, led by the 
liLSiegfried Sassoon, Collected Poems (London: Faber and Faber 
Ltd., 1942), p. 23. 
iaFord Madox Ford, No ~ Parades (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 
Inc., 1925), p. 311. 
13George Orwell, Burmese Days (New York: Harcourt Brace and Com-
pany, 1934), p. 69. 
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prestigious London Times, was overwhelmingly in support of the war in 
the Transvaal. The Manchester Guardian and the Westminster Gazette were 
the only newspapers that were not swamped by the patriotic fervor that 
swept the country during the Boer War. 
These two newspapers and W. T. s·tead' s Review of Reviews were the 
chie( public organs of anti-imperialist sentiment. They opposed both 
the methods of empire building and policies of the government in rela-
tion to its maintenance. This opposition existed at all levels of 
society, from Parliament to the working men in the mines and shipyards. 
Their opposition also ran the gamut of emotions: from the clear reason-
ing of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman to the bitter vituperation of the 
Blackburn Labor Journal. The Boer Wa:r became a contest between th.e ac-
tive]y aggressive imperialist faction and those less ambitious Britons 
who felt that closer ties should be forged within the existing Empire 
rathe:i; than expanding it indefinitely. 
1The character of the opposition was as diverse as the groups that 
compQsed it. This study will deal with opposition to the war between 
July, 1899 and June, 1902, and focus on three segments of the society: 
parltamentary opposition, socialist opposition, and the peace movement 
outside these two groups. As each of these segments is examined, the 
moti~e and character of its opposition will be assessed. The effect of 
the Opposition of each segment on the wartime policy decisions of the 
gover,nment will be evaluated. Rayne Kruger argues that "the war had 
severrely shaken people's confidence in the ruling class, 111 4 This study 
will :show how the opposition reflected this loss of confidence in the 
14Rayne Kruger, Good-bye Oolly Gray: ~ Story .2.f ~ Bper ~ 
(London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1959), p. 509. 
8 
leadership, thus revealing the first cracks in the British power struc-
ture. 
By promises of reform, the "Cecil dynasty" of Prime Minister Salis-
bury had won a decade of power for the Conservatives in the election of 
1895. But the next ten years were to prove rather barren on the domes-
tic 1:1cene, for vigorously expansive imperialism had caught the country's 
imagination. This was the area in which the Conservative Government 
would leave its mark. The man that would do this work was Joseph Cham-
berlain, Colonial Secretary.is 
The position of Colonial Secretary had previously been a relatively 
minor one, but this vigorous man made the office much more prestigious. 
Prime Minister Salisbury16 and A, J. Balfout17 , leader of the Conserva-
tive Party in the House of Commons, allowed Chamberlain a free hand in 
the Colonial Office as compensat.ion for Chamberlain's desertion of the 
Liberals in 1885 and his consequent loss of a possible Liberal premier-
ship. As early as 1893, Chamberlain had sounded the call for commercial 
imperialism in a speech to a Birmingham audience. There was, he said, a 
15Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914). Liberal M.P. for Birmingham, 
1876-85; Liberal Unionist M.P. for West Birmingham, 1885-1914. Presi-
dent, Board of Trade, 1880-85; President, Local Government Board, 1886; 
Secte!tary for Colonies, 1895-1903. 
16Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil (1830-1907). Third Marquess 
of Salisbury. Premier and Foreign Secretary, 1885-86, 1886-92, 1895-
1902. 
17Arthur James Balfour (1848-1930). Conservative M.P. for Hert-
ford, 1874-85; for East Manchester, 1885-1906; for City of London, 1906-
22. !Earl Balfour 1922. President, Local Government Board, 1885-86; Se-
cretaty for Scotland, 1886-87; Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1887-91; 
First Lord of the Treasury, 1891-92; Le:ader of the Conservative Party in 
the House of Commons, 1891-1902; Leader of Conservative Party, 1902-11; 
Prime Minister, 1902-05; First Lord of the Admiralty, 1915-16; Foreign 
Secretary, 1916-19; Lord President of the Council, 1919-22, 1925-29. 
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''necessity for using every legitimate opportunity to extend our in-
fluence and control in that great African continent which is now being 
opened up to civilization and to commerce. "1 8 Thus Chamberlain pointed 
to the area that was to feel much of the impact of his ideas for the ten 
years after 1895. Chamberlain felt that the government had done too 
little in aiding the colonies. Most of this work had been in the hands 
of private enterprise, and it was beyond their means to bring about im-
provement. For this reason Chamberlain felt that the Office of Colonial 
Secretary should take the initiative from the merchant and the investor. 
His opponents in the Liberal Party had be1;1n in a weak position 
since the disruption caused by the Home Rule controversy in 1886. Glad-
stone did not stand for re-election in 1895, and the party leadership 
passed to Lord Rosebery1 e, whose primary contribution was the coining of 
the t:erm "Commonwealth." The 1895 election, however, did place two 
Liberia ls in Commons who were to l1;1ave their mark in the future: Sir 
l 8 Speeches of Joseph Chamberlain (London, 1897), pp. 131 ff., as 
quoted in Louis L. Snyder, ed., ~ Imperialism Reader: Documents ~ 
Readi:ngs £.!.! Modern Expansionism (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company 
Inc., 1962), p. 125, 
1 9Archibald Philip Primrose (1847-1929), 5th Earl of Rosebery. 
Home Under-Secretary, 1881-83; Lord Privy Seal, 1885; Chief Commissioner 
of Works, 1885; Foreign Secretary, 1886, 1892-94; Prime Minister, 1894-
95. 
10 
Henrji' Campbell-Bannerman20 and David Lloyd George. 21 Thei,r party sub-
scribed to the motto of ''l'eace, Retrl;lnchment, and Reform": peace 
throughout the Empire; retrenchment in financial policy, with a surplus, 
or at worst, a balanced budget; and reform at home for the working popu-
lation. They took the position that the Conservatives were f.ollowing a 
"false" imperialism, in Lord Car.narvon' s definition, and supported the 
laissez faire policy which had been given its most definitive form by 
Gladstone. 
Upon Rosebery's resignation from the Liberal Party in 1896, leader-
ship passed to Sir W:i.lliam Harcourt.2 2 Harcourt's resignation in Decem-
ber, 1898, caused a political sensation because it opened to public dis-
play the sharp internal disagreement:s over foreign affairs that could 
lead to a total collapse of the Liberal Party. Harcourt's successor was 
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. It was hoped that as a moderate he could 
successfully bridge the gap between the left, dominated by Harcourt, 
~
0 Henry Campbell-Bannerman (1836-1908). Liberal M.P. for Stirling, 
1868-1908. Financ ia 1 Secretary, War Office, 1871-74, 1880-82; Secretary 
to Admiralty, 1882-84; Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1884-85; Secretary 
for War, 1886, 1892-95; Prime Minister, 1905-8; Leader of the Liberal 
Party~ 1899-1908. G.C.B., 1895. 
~1David Lloyd George (1863-1945). Liberal M.P. for Carnarvon 
Boroughs, 1890-1944. Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor, 1945. President, 
Board of Trade, 1905-8; Chancellor of Exchequer, 1908-15; Minister of 
Munitions, 191.5-16; Secretary for War, 1916; Prime Minister, 1916-22. 
Leader of the Liberal Party, 1926-31. 
22William George Granville Vernon Harcourt (1827-1904). Liberal 
M.P. for Oxford City, 1868-80; for Derby, 1880-95; for West Monmouth-
shire, 1895-1904. Solicitor General, 1873-74; Home Secretary, 1880-85; 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1886, 1892-95. 
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John Morley23, and David Lloyd George, and the right, represented by 
Edwatd Grey24 and H. H. Asquith2 6 • 
The Boer War split the Liberal Party into three groups. The Liber .. 
al Imperialists, numbering about fifty and led by Grey and Asquith, sup-
ported the wai to the extent of voting against their own party at times, 
The other extreme, tagged "pro-Boers" by the Conservatives, numbered be-
tween twenty and thirty in the House of Commons and were led by Har-
court, Morley and young Lloyd G.eorge. In the middle was Campbell-Ban• 
nerman and the majority of the Liberal Party, Because of Campbell-Ban-
nerman's attempts to hold the party together and appease all sections, 
he was dubbed "Sir Facing-Both .. Ways. uae 
While the British political structure was experiencing these ten-
Siona in anticipation of the approaching c·onflict, the people of the 
Transvaal were looking at a world that was preparing to plunge into the 
twentieth century through sixteenth-century eyes. The white population, 
or Boers, were farmers of Dutch d.escent who had continually resented the 
encroachment of civilization. In order to escape British domination, 
S3 John Morley (1838-1923). Liberal M.P, for Newcastle-on Tyne, 
1883-95, for Montrose Boroughs, 1896-1908. Viscount Morley, 1908, 
Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1886 and 1892-95. Secretary for India, 
1905~10. Lord President of the Council, 1910-14. 
?4Edward Grey (1862-1933). 
1885-l916. Viscount Grey, 1916. 
Foreitn Secretary, 1905-16. 
Liberal M.P. for Berwick-on-Tweed, 
Foreign Under-Secretary, 1892-95; 
?BHerbert Henry Asquith (1852-1928). Liberal M.P. for East Fife-
shireli 1886-1918; for Paisley, 1920-24. Earl of Oxford and Asquith, 
1925. Home Secretary, 1892-95; Chancellor of Exchequer, 1905-8; Prime 
Minister, 1908-16. Leader of Liberal Party, 1908-26. 
2 6 John s. Galbraith, ''The Pamphlet Campaign On the Boer War," Jour-
!!.!l .2! Modern History, XXIV (February, 1952), p. 114. 
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the Boers had moved into the interior of South Africa in a Great Trek 
which involved twelve thousand people and lasted from 1836 to 1843, The 
Transvaal had been peacefully annexed by Britain in 1877, but the vic-
tory of the Boers over the British at Majuba Hill in 1881 resulted in 
semi-independence for the Transvaal, There was still an element of con-
fusictn on the question of suzerainty :Ln the relations between the two 
countries. The Boers contended that: Britain's suzerainty no longer 
existed. The British, on the other hand, behaved as though they still 
exercised suzerain powers over the Transvaal. 
The discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand in 1886 was the key to 
the events which would culminate in war in October, 1899. The gold rush 
brought the usual tide of prospectors, speculators, and adventurers into 
the Transvaal. These persons were of both British and Continental des-
cent, but the number of British was especially large due to the easy ac-
ceseihility of the area from neighboring British-controlled territory. 
There are no definite figures available, but estimates range from 80,000 
to 120~000 British citizens living in the Transvaal in 1899. All these 
foreigners were collectively c1;1.lled ''Uitlanders," or foreigners by the 
Boers, It was inevitable that frictions would develop between the pious 
Boers and the boisterous Uitlanders. 
In the eyes of the British subjects at home, the most serious 
gl'.'ievance of the Uitlanders was their lack of political rights, but 
their complaints were many and varied. The miners had to contend with a 
government monopoly on the dynamite that was needed in their work. The 
tax records of 1896 showed that Uit landers provided three-fourths of the 
entire state revenue in the form of custom duties, telegraph and railway 
receipts, mining taxes, and postal receipts. By holding the rights to 
13 
all the railways in the country~ the monopolistic Netherlands Railway 
Company was able to charge exorbitant rates. With temperance reform in 
full swing at home, the British looked with alarm at the high rate of 
drunkenness among the native population. In British eyes, this repre-
sented a calculated demoralization of the blacks by the Boers. More-
over,; the Boers reserved the right to expel any alien from the country 
upon two weeks noti£ication.a7 
The tensions between the Transvaal and Great Britain were heighten-
ed by the Jameson Raid in December of 1895. Dr. Leander s. Jameson was 
a close friend of Cecil Rhodes, business magnate and Prime Minister of 
Cape .Colony. Jameson incorrectly believed that the Uitlanders would re-
volt if given armed support and attempted to provoke this revolt by his 
famous raid in December, 1895. The Boers captured Jameson's troop and 
turned the raiders over to the British Government for punishment. They 
were ,shipped off to England where they received light sentences. What 
parti:cularly annoyed both the Boers and the Liberal Opposition in 
Britain was the exoneration of Cecil Rhodes by Joseph Chamberlain. The 
main :results of the Raid were a stiffening of anti-British feeling, an 
increase in the stature of the President of the Transvaal, Paul Kruger, 
and l:ln upsurge in Afrikaner nationalism. Fi,gurl;ls show that the raid 
persuaded the Boers to increase their spending on armaments more than 
500% :l.n the year which followe·d. As the Liberal Manchester Guardian put 
it, if ''the Transvaal is armed to the teeth ••• it was armed by Mr. 
Rhode$ •.. whose attack upon it set it scouring Europe for guns, 
? 7James S, Worrall, "The British Press and the Transvaal Problem 
1881-1899" (unpublished Ph.D, dissertation, University of Michigan, 
1930), passim. 
ammunition, professional military skill, every means of protection 
against a second attack.u2e 
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During the next three years vain attempts were made to settle Uit-
landers' grievances by peace:ful me1;1ns, but the situation remained ripe 
for another incident. Just before Christmas, 1898, Boer police attempt-
ed td arrest a Johannesburg m:i,ner named Tom Edgar and shot him dead in a 
scuffle. The Uitlanders, incensed by the policeman's acquittal, sub-
mitted a petition of grievances to the British High Commissioner for the 
Cape Colony, Sir Alfred Milner, and to Queen Victoria. The British 
Government was forced to take action to ameliorate the grievances listed 
therein and demanded that the Transvaal ease its franchise and citizen-
ship restrictions on the Uitlanders. Though the Liberals in London 
hoped that the guidelines established by the recent Hague Convention 
would be followed in sett ling the dispt,1te, President Kruger was in no 
mood to make concessions to the British. By the end of August, 1899, it 
was apparent that both sides were resigned to a war. The British and 
the Boers had been tncreasing their troop strength throughout the sum.-
mer, and it was but a matter of time before the blow fell. 
The Boers delivered an ultimatum to the British Government on Octa ... 
ber 9 ~ 1899, demanding that all points of dif:ference be settled by arbi-
trati~n. In addition, all troops on the borders of the Republic and all 
reinf@rcements that had landed in South Africa since the first of June 
were t;o be withdrawn. All troops that were presently en route on the 
high $eas were not to be landed. Kruger warned that if these demands 
were not answered affirmatively within forty-eight hours the Transvaal 
28The Manchester Guardian, February 1, 1900, p, 7. 
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Govetnment would "be compelled to regard the action of Her Majesty's 
Gove:tnment as a forma 1 declaration of war. ''2 9 There was no h.ope of com-
pliance. On October 12, 1899, the Boers invaded Cape Colony. 
In Britain, the spirit for war was at a fever pitch, The world had 
just ·witnessed the United States defeat Spain in a neat, six-months' 
war. Brit-a in, it was believed, would have no trouble routing a group of 
poorly organized farmers. Yet this war would drag on for an agonizing 
two years and eight months before a final peace was achieved. The c·on-
flict would pass through fou:i; separate phases. The period October to 
December, 1899, was one of confidence and optimism ;i..n London until the 
mood ·was shattered by a series of defeats in mid-December. The second 
phase, from January to May, 1900, was one which c·ould be described as a 
"girding of the loins." It: was marked by heavy fighting and the suc-
c·ess:l;lul relief by the British of the three beleaguered cities of Lady .. 
smith~ Kimberley, and Mafeking. The conclusion seemed near during the 
third. phase between May and September, 1900. The capitals of the Trans-
vaal and the Orange Free State were captured, and the British controlled 
the lines of communications. To the military and civilian leaders in 
Britain, the war appeat'ed virtually over, inasmuch as the objectives of 
any c·(!>nventional war had been achieved. But in the months after Octo ... 
her, 1900, the war turned into a guerrilla action; the Boers dealt ser-
ious and repeated blows to their enemy but were at last forced to sur-
rendet by shee;r weight of numbers in June, 1902. From October, 1900, to 
the end of the war, Britons experienced a growing disillusionment toward 
the glories of empire and the capabilities of the nation's leaders. 
2 9Ibid., October 11, 1899, p. 4. 
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These periods will be examined in greater detail to give an overall pic-
ture of the military operations during the war. 
At the beginning of the war the British found themselves under 
siege in three places. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Baden-Powell was 
blockaded at Mafeking, and Colonel R, G, Kekewick was in command of a 
force in Kimberley. The Boers controlled the entire railway line from 
the Orange River to Rhodesia, and with the British bottled up in these 
two towns, their enemies could thrust into the western Cape. The situa-
tion was especially critical in Natal where the main British forces were 
invested in Ladysmith under constant pounding by the heavy Long Tom can-
nons of the Boers. In all three sieges, the Boers felt that nothing 
could be gained by bloody assaults on the encircled towns; they prepared 
to sit back and wait for the ripened fruit to fall into their hands. 
But by December, 1899, the offensive was shifting to the British . 
. !Englishmen were still enthusiastic about the war, Baden-Powell had 
captured British hearts with his cheerful messages from besieged Mafe-
king, and it was g:enerally agreed that open conflict rather than sieges 
would: decide the course of the war. This c·omplacency was soon to suffer 
a rudie shattering in "Black December." On December 10, 1899, Major 
Gener~ 1 William Gatacre' s force of 3, 000 men were defeated at Stormberg 
Junct:i.on with the loss of six hundred captured. This was start ling 
enough, but the next day witnessed the even more dismal defeat of 13,000 
crack British troops. This group, under the command of Lord Methuen, 
was o~ its way to Kimberley when attacked by Boers led by Piet Cronje at 
Magersfontein Hill. Upwards of a thousand men were killed, wounded, 
captured, or listed as missing. In the meantime, the commander-in-chief 
of British forces, General Redver Buller, was on the march in Natal to 
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relieve Ladysmith when the Boers fell on him at Colenso on December 15. 
Buller saw five V.C.'s and eighteen D.C.M.'s won on the battlefield that 
day, but he was nevertheless forced to abandon his march to Ladysmith 
after suffering 1,127 casualties.30 These defeats left no doubt that it 
would now be a long war. 
These setbacks of December marked the beginning of the second 
phase. Strategy was predicated on the dictum that wars were won by oc-
cupying the principal cities of the enemy, and every effort was now 
directed toward the relief of Kimberley, Ladysmith, and Mafeking, and 
the occupation of the capitals of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, 
Pretoria and Bloemfontein. Certain changes of command were felt neces-
sary before these objectives could be attained. Field Marshal Viscount 
Roberts had offered to take over the command of South Africa in Decem-
ber, 1899. Roberts was 67 years old and had made his record in India. 
After the ''Black Week" of December it was decided a change was needed, 
and Roberts' offer was accepted. Roberts' Chief of Staff was the 
younger Major General Kitchener, who had caught the public's fancy by 
his defeat of the Sudanese at Khartoum. 
Roberts' strategy was to execute a flank march up to Kimberley, 
then a cross country movement to Bloemfontein and Pretoria. He began 
his mol\Te toward Kimberley on February 13, 1900, and relieved the town 
two days later. The officers of the relief force were served champagne 
by the most notable member of the lately besieged garrison, Cecil 
Rhodes. Twelve days later, on the nineteenth anniversary of Majuba 
Hill, Piet Cronje surrendered with four thousand Boer troops to General 
3oKruger, Good-Bye Dolly Gray, p. 143. 
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Robe:tts. Word came the next day that General Buller had finally managed 
to b;ileak the siege of Ladysmith after taking four months to defeat an 
army that was only a third of his strength. 
Early in March, Roberts turned his forces toward Bloemfontein, the 
capital of the Orange Free State. Unlike the Transvaal, this little re-
publ:Lc was fully independent of British control, but joined the Trans-
vaal out of a common sense of danger when the conflict began. On March 
13, after feeble resistance by the Boers, Roberts marched into Bloem-
fontein. Pretoria, capital of the Transvaal, was the next target. 
While making plans for the march on Pretoria, Roberts ordered General 
Hunt(;!'r to relieve Mafeking. After a five day march, Hunter relieved the 
city which had been under siege for seven months. The def.ense of Mafe .. 
king had become a symbol of British doggedness that far outweighed any 
military significance it may have had. In Great Britain the streets 
were filled with people rejoicing, and college students ran riot in an 
orgy of jubilation. The relief of the siege of Mafeking gave a boost to 
Britiish morale and a new word to the English language.S 1 
The war m:oved into its third phase when Pretoria was occupied on 
June 5, 1900. To the British way of thinking, the war was over. The 
capital cities of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State had been oc-
cupied. The army was busy mopping up and chasing the commando units of 
Christian de Wet and Louis Botha, and it appeared but a matter of time 
before these two guerriUa leaders would be captured, Roberts. formally 
annexed the Transvaal on September 1, 1900, declared the war over, and 
s1 ''Maf' fick: to celebrate hilariously, as the English did after 
the relief of Mafeking." Websters New Collegiate Dictionary (Spring-
field,. Mass.: G. and C. Merriam Co., 1953), p. 504. 
orde:J;ied farms to be burned to destroy the harboring places of the Boer 
c·ommando units. 
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In October, 1900, the "khaki election" was held in Britain. The 
opposition charged that the election had been called simply to exploit 
the war to extend the Conservative Government's term of office. By law, 
parliamentary elections were to be held at least every six years, and 
though the Conservatives had been in office only five years and one 
month, they timed the election to coincide with the military successes 
in South Africa. After a harsh, mud-slinging electoral campaign, the 
Conservatives won 402 seats and 2,428,492 votes, while the Liberal and 
Irish parties won a total of 268 seats with 2,105,518 votes.3 2 
'While the Conservatives were basking in the glory of a comfortable 
majority, events were taking an ominous turn on the South Af:i:·ican front 
as the war shifted into its last stage. A new kind of warfare was 
beginning to appear which portended nothing but evil to the Libera.1 
press: ''People are getting tired of hearing that the war is over, ''33 
.'!'..!!! Manchest~r Guardian intoned at the end of October. The war would 
drag ,pn for yet another eighteen months. 
Roberts left Africa in December, 1900, to take the position of 
Commander-in-Chief, leaving Kitchener in command o;f South Africa. Kit· 
chenet realized he would exhaust his command by chasing the elusive com-
mando units. To avoid this, Kitchener introduced the blockhouse system 
to th¢ war. These blockhouses were built along the railroads to protect 
the supply lines. After securing the railroads they were pushed across 
32Edgar Holt, ~~War (London: Putnam, 1958), p. 184. 
$3The Manchester Guardian, October 26, 1900 0 p. 5. 
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the Open veldt until there were 8,000 separate installations at a dis-
tance of a mile to a mile and a half apart. The blockhouse lines were 
not impenetrable, but they restricted Boer movements to the night. 
1The policy of farll\-burning produced a problem of what to do with 
the dependents of the Boers. They were moved into refugee camps that 
came ''to be called "concentration camps." The term was innocuous at this 
time ,and simply designated a plac·e where persons were collected or con-
centrated. Due to poor planning, poor supplies, and overcrowding, how-
ever, the death rate among the women and children rose to alarming pro-
portions. Disclosure of these conditions caused a great Stir of protest 
at home. The conditions in the camp:s did improve, but they continued to 
provide a source of ammunition for the Liberal opposition. 
Within a year, Kitchener's draconian methods began to produce re-
sults:, and in March, 1902, the bell:Lgerents opened negotiations for a 
settlement. The Boers still demanded their independence, but this was 
totally ruled out by the British. The Boer leaders finally accepted the 
British proposals by a vote of fifty-four to six and signed the Treaty 
of Ve:1!,"eeniging on May 31, 1902, in a spirit of reconciliation. ''We are 
good friends now, ''34 said Kitchener confidently at the signatory cere-
mony. This war cost the British 22,000 dead at a cost of 200,000 
pound$, while the Boers' costs totalled 24,000 dead with untold property 
damage due to Kitchener's methods, 
ln wartime a nation generally presents a united front to all out-
sider$, friend and foe alike. A casual survey of the British ·newspapers 
during this time would suggest that this was true of Great Britain, But 
a4Holt, The Boer War, p. 290. 
----...----
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thera1 were elements in British society that opposed the war both prior 
to its beginning and throughout the duration of the war to the peace 
treaty. Opposition prior to the war: had centered on achieving a peace-
ful settlement of the crisis, but the Boer aggression had frustrated 
this pacific effort. As the war moved into its second phase after 
January, 1900, the oppos:ltion built up a steady to:rrent of criticism 
that peaked during the khaki election in the fall of 1900. As the war 
dragged on into its guerrilla phase, opposition continued almost un-
abated to the end of the waJ:". Anti-war sentiment emanated fre>m many 
diffet"ent segments of English society, but it was in Parliament that the 
oppos:l.tion voic·e was most effective. It :ls in the House of Commons~ 
therefore, that an examination of the forc·es opposing the war must 
begin~ 
CHAPTER II 
LIBERAL OPPOSITION 
Since 1895, when Gladstone let the mantle of the Liberal Party com-
mand fa 11, and Conservatives won their resounding victory at the polls, 
the Liberals had not been able to reestablish an effective leadership. 
The party had been weakened by the resignation of its previoue leader, 
Sir William Harcourt, in December, 1898. Harcourt had resigned in pro-
test over the Government's aggressive foreign policy, a policy which he 
felt was damaging the nation's fiscal stability, Criticism of the Gov-
ernment's course had caused divisions within the Liberal ranks, and Har-
court saw that it was important to preserve party unity rather than 
cause a complete rupture which would have destroyed any possibility of 
an effective opposition. His successor, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 
therefore, had to "sit on the fence" in the hope of maintaining party 
unity. Throughout the summer of 1899, Campbell ... Bannerman led the moder· 
ate c~nter of the Liberal Party and tried to keep dissension to a mini-
mum in the face of worsening relations with the Transvaal. 
The lei:t wing of the Libera 1 Party was led by Harcourt, John Mor .. 
ley, and David Lloyd George. Harcourt's opposition was directed against 
Government extravagance, and, while Morley agreed with Harcourt and 
joinee him in voicing strong opposition to the government policy in 
South Africa, Morley's opposition found its basis in humanitarian 
grounds. In Morley's opinion, the Liberal Party had to make up its mind 
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''whet:her it would be a party for militarism or a party against militar-
ism. '11 Lloyd George confronted the Government; with attacks rooted in a 
humanitarian concern tinged with Welsh nationalism. He aimed many of 
his arguments directly at the person of the Colonial Secretary, Joseph 
Chamb·erlain. The Irish Nationalists, led by John Dillon of c·ounty Mayo 
and John E. Redmond of Waterford, heatedly fought the Government: and 
displayed strong Irish nationalism in their arguments against the war. 
In return, Government leaders subjected them to t;he harshest of accusa-
tions, including that of treason. 
'rhe failure of the Bloemfontein Conference in June, 1899, marked 
the end of any hope for a peaceful settlement. The breakdown of nego-
tiations occurred over the quest;ion of granting the franchise to the 
Uit landers, Lord Milner, the British High Commissioner for South 
Africa, had demanded that the Uitlanders be granted citizenship and the 
franchise after five years of residency. President Kruger refused to 
accept this and countered with a proposal to grant the rights of natu-
ralization and franchise after two years to those miners who had settled 
in the Transvaal prior to 1890. For the post-1890 settlers it would re-
quire two years before citizenship would be granted and five additional 
years for the granting of the franchise. This offer was immediately 
rejected by Her Majesty's Government. The Liberals and Irish National-
ists took delight in pointing out that British law itself required an 
alien to reside in the country for five years before naturalizatiolil and 
exercise of the franchise. It struck Campbell-Bannerman as ludicrous 
"that we should go to war in order to hurry our own fellow-citizens into 
l.l'he Manchester Guardian, June 7, 1899, p. 4. 
·-
another citizenship."2 The opposition viewed the disagreement as a 
minor quarrel over a two-year difference between the two disputants. 
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The Jingoist spirit in Great Britain rose rapidly during the four-
month interval between the end of the Bloemfontein Conference in June 
and the outbreak of hostilities in October. Throughout the summer of 
1899, the British newspapers were filled with stories about troop move-
ments to the Cape Colony. When Campbell-Bannerman inquired if these 
plans for troop move.ments marked a change in Government policy, A. J. 
Balfour, the First Lord of the Treasury, coolly replied that the War 
Office was preparing for any emergency, however undesirable,i3 
With the question of the franchise the central point of the discus-
sion, the Opposition labored manfully to show the inconsistencies of the 
Government's position. They pointed out that universal manhood suffer-
age w,s not a reality even in Britain and not even a remote possibility 
in India. When the Government was asked why they were not as concerned 
about giving the franchise to the people of India as they were about the 
rights of the Uitlanders, a spokesman replied, "If you have a thoroughly 
good government without the franchise, then possibly the franchise is 
not required. "4 Campbell-Bannerman took great delight in quoting Cham-
berlain's prophecy on the results of a war with South Africa, On May 8, 
1896, Chamberlain had said, '~ war in South Africa would be one of the 
most serious wars that could possibly be waged. It would be a long war, 
a bitt¢r war, and a costly war, and ... it would leave behind impressions 
2 Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LXXV (1899), p. 695. 
i3Ibid., Vol. LXXII (1899), p. 186. 
4Ibid., Vol. LXXV (1899), p. 764. 
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of St'.rife which, .. generations would hardly be able to blot out,"5 This 
criticism by the Liberals had no effect on a Government that was bound 
by a ,tradition to protect the British citizen no matter where he might 
reside. 
Parliament was prorogued on August 9, 1899, and was to convene 
again on October 27. This two-month interval was a period of scant pub-
lic pronouncements except for a few speeches by Chamberlain and Balfour. 
On August 26, 1899, Chamberlain entertained a group of Liberal Unionists 
at his home in Birmingham. Responding to requests for a statement on 
affairs in South Africa, Chamberlain said that Great Britain had made 
all the concessions it could make at the Bloemfontein Conference and 
warned President Kruger that "the sands are running down in the glass," 
and that the issue was now in Kruger's hands, 6 The jingos welcomed this 
speech with great enthusiasm, but to the Opposition it appeared that 
Chamberlain was closing the door on a peaceful settlement. The Liberals 
felt that the Government was "publicly washing one's hands, as it were, 
of one's own obligations to labour for peace,"7 and demanded a special 
session of Parliament lest the nation go to war without the Opposition 
having a voice in the matter. However, the aggressive attack by the 
Boers ion October 12., 1899, took Britain by surprise and caused a tempor-
ary silencing of the Opposition. 
A special session of Parliament was called in October to provide 
appropriations for the war. In the Commons, Campbell-Bannerman did not 
6l,bid.' p. 691. 
6
~ Manchester Guardian, August 28, 1899, p. 5. 
7 Ibid. , p. 4. 
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openly oppose any money bills needed for the war but continued to attack 
the pre-war policies of the Government as the cause of the conflict. He 
deplored the necessity for fighting a white, European, and Christian 
government in the Transvaal. 8 To the extreme element in the Opposition, 
the Government was acting without regard to the 1884 Convention which 
ended Great Britain's suzerainty in the Transvaal or the recent Hague 
Convention which called for arbitration of disputes between nations. 
The supporters of the Government viewed the situation as a case of the 
Boers being overconfident since defeating the British at Majuba Hill :l.n 
1881. To this group it appeared that Majuba Hill was "coming home to 
roost, 11e The Opposition sadly stated that "if the land had been a 
potato field instead of a gold field there would have been no war.'~o 
During the special session from October 17 to October 27, 1899, the 
Libet!als limited their attacks to the Government's handling of the South 
African policy prior to the outbre,;1k of hostilities. However, the Irish 
Nationalists indulged in much sharper critici$m of the Government's 
policy. John Redmond, an Irish member, felt that the "calling together 
of Pa:.rliament at all is simply a farce" when the Government asked for a 
vote on a money bill without allowing the Opposition to voice an opin-
ion.11 Redmond, like other Irish members, persisted in comparing Brit· 
ish a1ctions in South Africa to her earlier oppressive acts in Ireland. 
This finally resulted in Redmond's ejection from the House of Commons on 
8 Ibid,, November 28, 1899, p. 8. 
9Great Britain, Parliamentarx Debates, Vol. LXXV (1899), p. 721. 
1°Ibid., Vol. LXXVII (1899), P• 534. 
11 Ibid., p. 131. 
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October 20, 1899.12 
Replying to these continuous challenges by the Irish members, Cham-
berl~in and Balfour declared that it was not a time for criticism but a 
time for solidarity. Bills were put forward by the Government asking 
for ten million pounds out of the consolidated fund, eight million 
pounds to be raised by issuing treaeury bills, and the power to call up 
the reserve and militia units. Sir William Harcourt opposed the methods 
used in raising funds because too much reliance wae placed on the re-
venue of the mines after the war. He felt that an increase :l,n the in-
come tax was necessary and argued that a time limit be plac·ed on the re-
payment of the extra debts that the Government incurred. The income tax 
was b:iltterly opposed by the upper income groups in the country, and the 
oppo$Jit.ion sarcastically said they hated to see the "privations endured 
at Chatsworth, Blenheim, and other famine districts" increased. 13 
lhe remainder of the year was spent in a cautious attitude of ''wait 
and see." Campbell-Bannerman continued to attack the Government's 
policy as the real cause of the war. The early conviction that it would 
only ~ea matter of time before the British arms would triumph was rude-
ly shattered with the events of Black Week in December, 1899. By the 
end of December, there was considerable doubt whether "the clase of men 
who h$ve muddled into war are the most competent leaders to muddle out 
of it 1 " 14 The British stiffened their upper lips as the war moved into 
:is 2Ibid., p. 466. 
:i:. 3 ~ Manchester Guardian, October 25, 1899, p. 7. 
1 4Morning ~ quoted in~ Manchester Guardian, December 26, 
1899, p. 4. 
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its $econd stage: the lifting of the sieges of Kimberley, Ladysmith, 
and Mafeking and the seizure of the enemy's capitals. 
'The debate on the budget clearly showed the differences of opinion 
between the moderates and the radicals in the Liberal party. The 
Queen's Speech opening .Parliament on January 30, 1900, requested in-
creased expenditure for the South African war and the naval armaments 
race that was developing among the great powers. It specifically post-
paned domestic reforms involving large expenditures. Campbell-Bannerman 
supported military expenditures that would correct deficiencies but op-
posed any alteration that would "facilitate an aggressive or ambitious 
polic'y. rris The left wing element of the party under Haicourt 's leade'X' ... 
ship ,assailed the war as increasing the public debt to unreasonable 
heights. Harcourt's statistics showed that during the Crimean War 
forty-one million pounds were raised by taxation as compared to only 
twelv,e million pounds during the present war, though the country was far 
wealthier. The country was singing "pay, pay, pay," in the music halls 
but it sounded like "borrow, borrow, borrow," to Harcourt. ::.s To meet 
his budget Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor for the Exchequer, 
propo$ed a one shilling income tax with additional taxes placed on beer, 
tea, $pirits, and tobacco. The prestigious Times opposed these mea-
sures,, and instead called for a tax on corn and sugar to lighten the 
load of the rich. The Guardian sardonically said that to the Times' way 
of thinki,ng, taxing the poor was "'broadening the bases of taxation, 1 
15Great Britain, Parliamentary_ Debates, Vol. LXXXIX (1900), pp. 
248-249. 
16 Ibid., Vol. LXXX (1900), p. 226. 
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there being more poor persons than rich ones. ••1 7 The Liberal press, 
upon learning of the increased expenditures proposed in the Army and 
Navy estimates, caustically inquired of the Government, "If your prepar-
ations were not up to your diplomacy why not reduc·e you:i: diplomacy to 
the level of your preparations?"lB 
The c~mduct of the war was criticized in an amendment to the 
Queen's Speech expressing regret at the lack of "knowledge, foresight, 
and judgment" by Her Majesty's Government in the "cause and conduct of 
the war."19 The Government's answer to this attack was a call for unity 
throughout the country during the war and a declatation that there had 
been no lack of men, materials, or money in the prosecution of the war. 
The OJ?position agreed that "there was no lack of anything--except 
brain,,s • .uao Harcourt laid the re:sponsibility for the war at the door of 
the Jingoist newspaper establishment. Quoting Prince Bismarck, Harcourt 
charged that "the panes of glass which the press have broken we have to 
pay f:or. "21 This amendment to the speech was defeated, but in a rare 
act o!f unity leaders of all three Liberal factions, Grey, Campbell-Ban-
nermain, and Lloyd George, voted for the amendment. 
~nother element of controversy was the Liberal defense of the right 
of di:Ssent. Groups holding meetings in opposition to the war had been 
subje~ted to violence from unruly crowds. The Opposition declared that 
134. 
~
7 The Manchester Guardian, March 7, 1900, p. 5. 
i 8 Ibid., February 3, 1900, p. 10. 
isGreat Britain, Parliamentarx Debates, Vol. LXXXVIII (1900), p. 
2orbid., p. 545. 
21Ibid., p. 60S. 
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the t:raditions of free speech were not being upheld and asked if the 
Government was taking steps to protect the life and property of these 
participants at these meetings. Replying for the Government, A. J. Bal-
four admitted that such outbreaks were deplorable, but' pointed out that 
the local authorities were responsible for maintenance of order. Anti-
war speakers should be aware, he said, that they were asking a great 
deal of human nature in times of high public emotion.2 2 The Government 
was winking an eye at its groundling supporters. 
A series of dispatches between British commanders in the field were 
published in April, 1900, which gave substance to Liberal charges of in-
competence and further exacerbated the controversy. The dispatches were 
concerned with the British defeat at Spion Kop during the last week of 
January, 1900, and implied that serious tactical errors had occurred. 
The messages included one in which General Roberts censured General 
Bullet' and another which revealed Buller' s suggestion that Colone.I 
White surrender Ladysmith. The nation was shocked by this admission by 
the Government that perhaps some of the generals in South Africa were . 
incompetent. What was astonishing was that even though the generals had 
been censured, they had been retained in positions of command. 
While the budget was being debated the floor was opened for debate 
on the! Spion Kop dispatches by means of a motion to reduce the salary of 
the Secretary of State. The Government was as dismayed as the Opposi-
tion by the revelations disclosed. There appeared to be no logical rea-
son at all for publishing them. ''Was it to reassure the public ••• that 
some of our best generals are incapable? ..• Will it console the relatives 
aaGreat Britain, Parliamentary Debates, LXXX (1900), pp. 928-929. 
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of tn,ose who fell ..• at Spion Kop?" the Opposition inquired.as The 
amendment was defeated with several abstentions by Conservative members, 
but G!rey, Campbell-Bannerman, and Lloyd George supported the motion. To 
prevent such unpleasant disclosures in the future, the Government tight-
ened censorship, leaving it open to charges of withholding information 
during the remainder of the war. 
In June, 1900, another storm of criticism swirled around the Gov-
ernme.nt's conduct of the war. William Burdett-Coutts, M.P. for West-
minster, had made a trip to South Africa to inspect the medical facili-
ties. Upon his return, he published a ~eries of articles in the Times 
based on his findings. Burdett-Coutts described scenes of overcrowding, 
lack of sanitation, and poor transportation which increased the suffer-
ing of the wounded. Patients w:lth typhoid were jammed :into bell tents 
with ~on-typhoid patients. He saw men lying on the ground with nothing 
but a thin rubber sheet or a layer of straw to protect them from the 
dampness and the chill of the night. 2 4 A scandal comparable to those of 
the Crimean War appeared to be developing. 
the Government replied to these charges by waving the flag and 
charging that Burdett-Coutts' report was slander on the brave British 
soldier. They argued that these conditions were inevitable in a war 
that moved so rapidly over the countryside; General Roberts had more im-
portant things to worry about than hospital conditions. Burdett-Coutts 
was c~arged with not having the House's permission to go to South 
Africa. He was accused of acting merely as a newspaper correspondent 
23Ibid., LXXXII (1900), p. 796. 
24~ Manchester Guardian, June 28, 1900, p. 5. 
looking for a sensational story. General Roberts saved the Government 
from further humiliation by personally requesting a commission to come 
to South Africa and examine the medical facilities. 
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A three-man commission composed of two doctors and a lawyer was ap-
pointed in July, 1900. The Liberals objected to this commission as be-
ing too small and prejudiced in favor of the medical profession. Camp-
bell-Bannerman did not want to see this issue develop into a party 
fight, but he did want laymen on the commission, and succeeded in having 
two additional members appointed. 26 Still Liberal opinion was not sat-
isfied. Objections were raised to the new members because they were re-
ceiving salaries from the War Department. It was pointed out that the 
commi!ssion lacked the power to examine witnesses under oath, to call 
witnesses, or have documents produced for examination. Upon being told 
that the funds for the commission would come out of the Army Estimates 
under the title of temporary commissions, an Irish member puckishly 
asked, ''Will an item for whitewash be included?''26 
By coincidence, the report of the Commission on the Care of the 
Sick and Wounded was issued on the day of Queen Victoria's death, 
January 23, 1901. The conclusion of the report was that the treatment 
of the sick and wounded was generally satisfactory and there was nothing 
that ~ould be called scandalous. 27 Any neglect which might have occur-
red was awing to the fact that the Army Medical Department had not ex-
panded to keep up with the rapid military build-up caused by the war. 
? 6 Great Britain, Parl:i,.amentary Debates, Vol. LXXXV (1900), p. 656. 
2 6 Ibid., Vol. LXXXVII (1900), p. 629. 
27The Manchester Guardian, January 23, 1901, p. 8. 
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Recommendations by the Commission to the Army Medical Department in-
eluded better training, appointment of qualified sanitary officers, re-
laxation of the harsh military discipline in the hospitals, and the use 
of female nurses; the patients preferred them to the customary male or-
der lies. Burdett-Coutts agreed with much of the Commission's repo:i:t, 
but he was angered by their cursory treatment of the actual conditions. 
The Commission felt that the dampness did not cause any suffering and 
the bugs had never been in sufficient numbers to affect the patients. 
Burdett-Coutts suggested that the Commissioners ought to lie on the damp 
ground before making such a judgment and inquired sarcastically as to 
''how many bugs must browse upon a patient's body before he can be offi-
cially described as uncomfortable?'12 9 Improvements were made, but it 
took a public disclosure of the medical conditions to produce the 
changes, and thi's gave the Government a black mark. 
In August and September, 1900, the capita ls of the l'iansvaal and 
the Orange Free State were occupied, and Britons presumed the war to be 
over. Roberts announced the formal annexation of the Transvaal on 
September 4, 1900. 29 In response to Libera 1 inquiries concerning the 
terms of peace, Chamberlain and Salisbury had already made it clear that 
Britain would not '~ffer a shred of really independent government to 
either State. "Sc. Chamberlain was calling a spade a spade when he said, 
in reference to the future status of the Transvaal, ''You may call it, if 
you like, a military administration. I prefer to call it a Crown Colony 
28 Great Britain, Parliamentary_ Debates, Vol. LXXXIX (1901), pp. 
268-269. 
29The Manchester Guardian, September 4, 1900, p. 5. 
3 0 Ibid. ' May 3 0' 19 00' p . 6. 
34 
Government. ''31 These humiliating terms the Transvaal refused to accept, 
and the war began to turn into a guerrilla conflict. In September, 
1900, it became apparent how ugly this could become when Roberts issued 
orders to burn Boer farms near points where attempted sabotage of trains 
had occurred.32 
The main issue of the elections in October, 1900, was the war. The 
campa:Lgn was marked by much bitterness on both sides. The use of cam-
paign posters that portrayed Liberal candidates in the act of helping 
Pres:Ldent Kruger haul down the British flag was common. In reply to the 
Conservatives' claim that the Liberal party motto was out of date, Uar-
court replied, "as we left them peace, we left them a full exchequer." 
The war, he charged, had occasioned "a condition of f;i..nance which makes 
the performance of those promises [of social reform] impossible in the 
future. "33 The Liberals concentrated their attacks on Chamberlain. As 
Campbell-Bannerman put it, ''we hear dim echoes of some other members of 
the Government making speeches, but it is Mr. Chamberlain alone--he is 
the Government for the purposes of this election. "34 
Despite Opposition efforts, the success of the troops in South 
Africa and the lack of desire to change horses in midstream resulted in 
an easy majority for the Conservatives. The 334 Conservatives- plus 68 
Liberal Unionists gave the Government a majority of 134. After the 
election there was a reshuffling of cabinet positions and a number of 
624. 
3 :~Ibid., May 12, 1900, p. 11. 
3 '2Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LXXXVIII (1900), p. 
3~The Manchester Guardian, September 27, 1900, p. 8. 
34Ibid., October 9, 1900, p. 9. 
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the Prime Minister's relatives were appointed to the cabinet. Wags re-
ferreid to the new ministry as ''The Hotel Cecil Unlimited. "36 Campbell-
Bannerman humorously said, ''The stable remains the same; the horses at"e 
the same; but every horse is in a new stall. rrae 
Disillusionment began to set in during the post-election period as 
it became clearer that war would continue. Letters of protest against 
the farm burnings and the use of concentration camps began to appear in 
the Liberal press,3 7 Parliament was not due to convene until February, 
1901, but a special session was called in December, 1900, to pass needed 
money bills for the war. Campbell-Bannerman felt that the Queen's 
Speech opening the session left something to be desired with its request 
for more money at this time and its omission of a statement on the con .. 
dition of relations with other powers. Moreover, a conflict of interest 
controversy reared its head. Lloyd George made a direct attack on Cham-
berlatn in a motion which provided that ministers "ought to have no in-
terest direct or indirect in any fitm or company competing for contracts 
with the Crown. '13 8 The occasion for this motion lay in the fact that 
the firm of Kynoch and Company, a supplier of explosives to the Crown, 
was directed by Arthur Chamberlain, the Colonia 1 Secretary's brother. 
Campbell-Bannerman supported Lloyd George's motion on the grounds that 
~ 5 The Aµnua 1 Register 12.QQ (London: Longmans, Green and Co. , 
1901) ~i p. 234. 
::116~ Manchester Guardian, November 16, 1900, p. 6. 
3;7Ibid., November 12, 1900, p. 6. 
3 8Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LXXXVIII (1900), p. 
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such connections could sway a man from his public duty.as In his de-
fense, Chamberlain gave an emotion-charged reply claiming that he had 
dissolved all such ties before assuming his ministerial position. His 
family had been in commercial activities for two hundred years, he said; 
it appeared that all his relatives would have to quit business to satis-
fy this proviso.4o The motion was defeated 253 to 105. The Govern-
ment's request for an additional eleven million pounds was grantec;l with 
little opposition save that of the Irish Nationalists and Harcourt. On 
December 15, 1900, Parliament was prorogued for two months. 
The King's Speech on February 14, 1901, expressed regret that the 
war was not concluded and confidence that the end was not far off. Af-
ter all, British troops were occupying the capitals and the principal 
lines of communications of the enemy. 41 In reply t:o the speech, Camp-
bell-Bannerman denounced the Government for its lack of social legisla-
tion and for making political hay out of the supposed end of the war, 42 
The budget for 1901-02 was presented in April, 1901. The war was 
costing about one million to one and a quarter million pounds per 
week,4s and it was an accepted fact that there would have to be an in-
crease in expenditures. But how was this money to be raised? The be-
lief that increased taxation would be but temporary and that peace in 
South ,Africa would bring a remission had to be discarded. Harcourt 
39Ibid., p. 460. 
4s'0 Ibid. 
4 1 The Manchester Guardian, February 15, 1901, p. 6. 
42ibid. 
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expressed regret that the five years of Conservative government had in-
creased the Army and Navy Estimates by twenty-five million pounds. The 
blame for this militaristic extravagance had to be shared '~artly by 
responsible members and greatly by the press. ''44 
To meet the increased expenditures, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach pro-
posed' an increased income tax, a year's extension of the duties on to-
bacco, beer, and spirits, and two new duties: one on sugar and an ex-
port tax on coal. 46 The Liberals accepted these proposale except for 
the coal duty. The question was who would ultimately bear this one-
shilling export duty on coal: the foreign consume):' or the British miner 
in the form of a wage reduction? Delegations from the mining areas came 
to London and made personal appeals to Hicks-Beach against the coal 
duty. The Government argued that the coal industry had made such vast 
increases in profits during the previous two years that a one-shilling 
duty was negligible. In the debate on the coal duty, Sir William Har-
court begged the House's forgiveness for discussing such elementary 
economics, but pointed out that the Government was violating the funda-
mental law of supply and demand. The export duty on coal, he argued, 
gives "the foreign competitor the advantage and damnifies the trade of 
your own country. '146 These arguments were of no avail, and the coal 
duty was passed. 
A play for increasing the size of the standing army was presented 
by the Government in May. Six army corps were to be formed with a fifty 
38. 
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thousand-man Reserve and a thirty-five thousand-man yeomanry as a first 
step in the reo'l:'ganization of the entire military system. This brought 
opposition from within the Conservative party as well as from the oppo-
site bench. The new M.P. from Oldham, Winston Churchill, was in favor 
of arrily reform, but this was "not army reform, but army increase. ''4 7 
Churchill looked upon the navy as the right army of the Empire, while 
the a:r:my was only an "umbrella that is needed from time to time. '148 The 
main concern was that an increase in the army would mean a reduction in 
the navy and that conscription would appear with all the attendant evils 
of militarism that were seen on the Continent. Campbell-Bannerman ar-
gued that the proposals were not adapted to the wants of the Empire and 
would "increase the burdens of the nation without adding substantially 
to its military strength, "49 Nevertheless, a Government majority of 
over one hundred supported military reform, thus clearing the way for a 
complete reorganization. 
In June and July, 1901, the Liberal party went through a period of 
crisis which was precipitated by the British evacuation of the South 
African native population and Boer dependents into internment camps. 
The camps had a dual purpose: they removed the women and children from 
the battlefield and deprived the Boer commando units of a means of sup-
ply. These camps were poorly planned and hastily erected, and the re-
sult was a rising death rate among the women and children, Further con-
firmati.on of the Opposition's charges was furnished by the p-ublication 
4 7Ibid., p. 1571. 
4 8 The Manchester Guardian, May 20, 1901, p. 12. 
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of a report by Miss Emily Hobhouse when she returned from an on-the-spot 
examination of the camps. 50 This Government internment policy caused 
Campbell-Bannerman to make a statement which almost provoked a collapse 
of the Liberal Party. 
Addressing the National Reform Union on June 15, 1901, Campbell-
Bannerman charged the Government of using "methods of barbarism in South 
Africa. "6 1 This phrase, "methods of barbarism," shocked the more moder-
ate Liberal leaders. It appeared that Campbell-Bannerman was making a 
direct attack on the military leaders in South Africa, and a complete 
schism appeared to be developing in the Liberal Party. 
A meeting of the Oppoeition party was set for July 9, 1901, for the 
purpose of resolving these differences through a vote of confidence in 
Campbell-Bannerman as the party leader. At this meeting Campbell-Ban-
nerman asserted that the party was not divided on any real difference of 
opinion but because of "certain persona1 antagonisms, which! •• have dis-
turbed and paralyzed the Liberal Party in Parliament. 116 :a In regards to 
the war, the party had an obligation to oppose and question the present 
administration and the future policy in South Africa. In carrying out 
this obligation, he felt that four-fifths of the party would support 
him. A:;iquith and Grey both made speeches deprecating the sectional 
cliques of the party but indicated at the same time that the Liberal Im-
perialists would voice views opposing the party whenever it was felt 
necesaary. After these statements, a resolution was passed unanimously 
6°The Manchester Guardian, June 19, 1901, p. 10. 
61 Ibid., June 15, 1901, p. 7. 
62 Ibid., July 10, 1901, p. 8. 
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in s~pport of Campbell-Bannerman's leadership. 63 
The reaction to this meeting was mixed. In Liberal circles it was 
seen as a stiffening of the ranks, with Campbell-Bannerman climbing down 
from his fence rail position. The entire Liberal Party appeare.d to have 
made a shift to the left, and "had now quite abandoned the attempt to 
harmonize the irreconcilables, and had thrown all [its] weight to one 
side. "64 The Conservatives, on the other hand, regarded the endorsement 
of Campbell-Bannerman's leadership as merely a temporary party truce; 
Asquith and Grey still held reservation about party policies, 0th.er 
Conservatives said that the Liberal Party would never have peace as long 
as Sir William Harcourt and Lord Rosebery, both fotmer party leaders, 
continued their bitter feud over foreign policy,66 
the army reorganization plan was put into effect in June, 1901. 
Local commanders were encouraged to take more responsibility, and the 
top l~vel of command was consolidated into a War Office Board. Sir Red .. 
vers Buller was named commander of the First Army Corps, a unit which 
would be the first to be used in any emergency outside the British 
Isles. In October, Buller offered a vindication of his role in the de-
feat $t Spion Kop, in which he intimated that there was a conspiracy 
among the press aimed at discrediting him. The Government wisely re-
tired him from active duty, thus avoiding any revival of discussion of 
the Spion Kop tragedy or criticism of Buller' s c·ommand of the First Army 
Corps. 
S3 Ibid .. 
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!During the summer and fall of 1901 there was a continued outcry 
against the Government's use of concentration camps. But the more un-
ruly supporters of the Government broke up meetings at which Miss Hob-
house, the outspoken critic of the concentration camp policy, was sched-
uled to speak. 56 The Government announced on July 22, that a committee 
of ladies was being sent to South Africa to examine the conditions of 
the camps. Miss Hobhouse was not included in this committee on the 
grounds that she was too controversial a figure to be included. 
While plans were made to correct the camp conditions, an attempt 
was ail.so made to place the blame for the high death rate on the Boers. 
Stories were circulated which alleged that the Boer women were dirty, 
ignorant about sanitation, and incompetent to raise their children.. Ac-
tually the death rate was a result of poor planning by the British, in-
adequate housing, the lack of proper food for children, and insufficient 
fuel to insure the proper cooking of the food. 67 The heart of the prob-
lem was the inadequate method of supplying the camps. The death rate 
decreased by the end of 1901 because the camps were moved into areas 
that could be more easily reached with supply trains and medic;:al person-
nel. The camps left a stigma of inhumanity against the British which 
would be used as propaganda by the Germans in the future. 
T'.he Government continued to demand unconditional surrender as the 
only acceptable terms for peace. On August 7, 1901, Kitchener issued a 
procla 1mation stating that all Boers who did not surrender before Septem-
ber 15i, 1901, would be sentenced to perpetual banishment from South 
56 The Manchester Guardian, July 1, 1901, p. 5. 
57Ibid., October 25, 1901, p. 6~ 
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Africa after that date. 68 The Opposition branded this a policy of anni-
hilation. Why should the Boers not continue to fight, the Liberals 
asked., when nothing remained for them if they surrendered? Once again 
there was a demand that the Government make an offer of reasonable terms 
which would encourage the Boers to lay down their arms, and the Septem-
ber deadline passed with the war no c lose:r to a cone lusion. The comman-
do units of the Boers continued to attack isolated British units, while 
in Britain, Hicks-Beach declared that the taxpayers would be asked for 
further sacrifices in 1902, 69 
As the nation moved into the third year of the war, Chamberlain re-
surrected the myth of the Boer conspiracy, and declared that the war 
''was a struggle for supremacy between two race.a, that it was a question 
whether the Union Jack or the Boer Vierkleu:r should wave throughout the 
length and breadth of South Africa.'~ 0 To the Liberals it seemed incon-
gruous that a group of pious farmers who had a history of moving inland 
away from British control should now be accused of launching an effort 
to bring all of Sot,tth Africa into a Boer empire. ln answer to this im-
perialistic reasoning, Lloyd George declared that the war had changed 
the entire course of the nation's social and political history and that 
"money that would have built comfortable homes for hundreds of thousands 
of wotkmen had gone to dig graves in Africa. "61 Campbell-Bannerman con-
tinued his now much more direct attacks on the Government by opposing 
S,sibid., August 10, 1901, p. 7. 
SSibid,, November 5, 1901, p. 4. 
60 Ibid., November 7, 1901, p. 10. 
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the rn:ethods of warfare and accusing the Cabinet of skulking behind the 
backs of the British soldier when they could not defend their own meth-
ods. 6 ::i 
Parliament opened on January 16, 1902, with the reading of the 
King's Speech. Regret was again expressed that the war was not ended, 
and the announcement was made that more troops from the Dominions would 
be needed. The Opposition moved an amendment to the King's Speech stat-
ing that they were prepared to support a].1 proper measures for the pro-
secution of the war but at the same time, pointing out that t;he "course 
pursued by your Majesty's Ministers ... [has] not conduced to the early 
termination of the war. 116 3 The amendment was defeated by a majority of 
210. 
The 1902-03 budget was presented in April. It showed a deficit of 
forty·five million pounds which was to be met by several methods such as 
drafts on the Exchequer, an increase in the income tax, and what was the 
most alarming measure of all to the Opposition, a tax on the importation 
of grain, corn, flour, and meal. This seemed to be a direct attack on 
the sacred principle of free trade. Supporters of free trade viewed the 
corn outy as a threat to national solvency and a tampering with the sys-
tem by which Britain had always paid her own way. 6 4 Sir William Har-
court led the attack on the corn duty. Campbell-Bannerman, reflecting 
his new stance, voiced the opinion that he had some doubts as to whether 
the Government had used past estimates very wisely. He had always given 
6l2Ibid., December 11, 1901, p. 7. 
El3The Times (London), January 22, 1902, p. 6, 
6 4The Manchester Guardian, April 15, 1902, p. 7. 
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his support to monetary requests before, but this attack on free trade 
caused a change of attitude. Harcourt argued that this duty was a di-
rect tax on the food of the poor. In response, the Government countered 
that free trade had always been largely a myth, :.that both Peel and Glad-
stone had retained a corn duty in some form, and that it was not totally 
abolished until 1869. 66 Supported by such arguments as these, the duty 
of 3d. per hundredweight of grain was passed against heavy opposition, 
As 1902 approached it was apparent that each of the combatants was 
seeking an opening to start negotiations for ending the conflict. In 
February, 1902, the Netherlands made an offer to get negotiations under-
way. They asked that the Boer leaders in exile in the Netherlands be 
allowed to return to South Africa to consult with the field commanders 
before traveling to Great Britain with definite proposals of peace, 
This offer was rejected by the British on the grounds that the war would 
be prolonged by three months simply because of transportation problems 
involved in the offer. It would also be undignified for the British Em-
pire to allow a third party to intervene in a war with some rag-tag 
farmers who should have been defeated two years earlier. The rejection 
of this offer had the effect of eliminating President Kruger and his 
government in exile in the Netherlands from any role in negot.iations, 
and shifted the real role of leadership to the Boer commando leaders in 
South Africa. At last, in April, 1902, the Boers in South Africa de-
clared that it was "a suitable moment to do everything possible to put a 
6 5Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CVI (1902), pp. 181-
183. 
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stop to the war. •,es 
On April 12, the Boers requested peace on the following terms: 
that the franchise be granted all whites; that equal rights be granted 
the people of the two republics to use both the Dutch and English lan-
guage1s; that the establishment of a customs, postal, telegraph, and 
railway union be permitted between the two republics and neighboring 
British colonies; that all forts be dismantled; that arbitration be re-
quested in any future disputes; and that mutual amnesty be granted to 
prisoners. These conditions were rejected by the British on the ground 
that 'they would effectively continue the independence of the two repub-
lies. Besides, the Boer states were non-existent, since they had been 
formally annexed by General Roberts in 1900.67 
After thie refusal, the Boer representatives (Steyn, Schalk-Burger, 
and Botha) asked that they be allowed to canvass the burghers in the 
field on the question of surrendering the independence of thei:i;- c·ountry. 
They contacted each commando and requested that two burghers be chosen 
to represent the respective commando at a meeting to be held at Vereen-
iging on May 15, 1902. The peace camp at Vereenig:i.ng was laid out in an 
area two miles square, near the station on the Transvaal side of the 
Vaal Rive:i;-. Lighting, water, medical, and cooking facilities were pro-
vided for the Boer delegates by the British.68 The pµrpose of the 
Veree•iging meeting was to allow the Boers to decide whether or not to 
Ssareat Britain, British~ Foreign State Papers 1901-19·02, Vol. 
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continue the war, after which they would contact the British j.f a favor-
able decision was reached. From Apl:'il 19 until May 15, groups of Boers 
travelled from commando to conunando, frequently crouing British lines 
to make fina 1 arrangements for the meeting. 
At the meeting the delegates made the following proposals: that 
the r1epublics would surrender independence in conducting foreign r·ela-
tions; that they would retain self-government under British supervision; 
and that a portion of their territory would be surrendered. 6 9 The 
burghers were hoping that this return to the l,)retol"ia Convention o.f 1881 
would be acceptable. These proposals, too, were rejected completely and 
countered by a British offer to d:i:-aft a document which would be submit-
ted to a ''Yes" or ''No" vote by the Boers. There were objections to 
this, but as both Boer and British leaders were to participate in draft-
ing the document, there was no alternative. In drafting the document of 
surrender it was decided that the proclamation of perpetual banishment 
issued by Kitchener in September, 1901, could be dropped because all 
Boers would be required to swear allegiance to King Edward VII. 
The joint document was presented on May 28, and the British granted 
the Boers seventy-two hours before asking that a reply be given. The 
document was signed by Milner, Kitchener, and ten Baer delegates at 
10:30 P.M. on May 31, 1902. All persons under arms were to surrender 
and pledge their loyalty to the King. No property was to be t·aken, and 
the Be>ers would be allowed to keep their arms. Self-govet"nment was 
promi$ed as rapidly as possible. The British Government granted a sum 
of tht!ee million pounds for the purpose of rebuilding farms and 
69 Great 5ritain, British and Fo.reig-q State Paeers 1901-1902, Vol. 
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restoration of livestock. The problem of the native population was dis .. 
missed with the statement: "The quest·iqn of granting the franchise to 
natives will not be decided until after the introduction of self .. govern .. 
ment. "70 
Boisterous celebrations brok.e out in London with the announcement 
of the surrender. It was 1;1nother display of mafficking •. :The Liberal 
party praised the terms g;Lven, while the Times laconically remar·ked, 
I .. . 
"The Ministry •.• have committed not; a few blunders before and after the 
outbreak of hostiliti,es. "71 The Gover1'ment 's mil:f,.tary leaders had made 
blunders in tactics as seen in alack December and Spion Kop. Government 
nepotism had been revealed by Lloyd George. The fiscal policie1;1 had 
been assailed by the Liberal left. The worst error made by the Govern-
ment was its ref'Usal to admit that mistakes had been made in the case of 
the army medical facilities ,imd the c·once.ntration camps. Instead of ac-
cepting blame and quietly correctine; the miongs, they had taken s·helter 
behind the :British soldier by accusing the Opposition of attacking t:he 
brave lads far from home. These were the errors. 
But how effective had the Libe:r;a1s been in their opposition? The 
L.iberal party was weakened by intet!nal strife at the beginning of the 
war. No really united opposition thrQughoµt the part·y had be.en achieved 
until the duty on corn was imposed. Any attempt to work with the out-
spoken Irish Nationalists would have resulted in the possibility of a 
revival of the Rome Rule controversy. The Liberal leaders remembered 
Gladstone's expe,::iences too well to allow this to happen. The Liberals' 
7oibid., p. 161. 
7 1The Times (London), June 2, 1902, p. 11. 
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most effective opposition was their humanitarian action against the con-
centration camps and inadequate medical facilities. After the party 
meeting of July, 1901, the Liberals presented a more solid front and 
we:i:-e no longer afraid of fomenting P!!lrty schisms by questioning Govern-
ment policy. This solidifying of the Liberal ranks plus a general reac-
tion by the public against the prolonged war forced the Government to be 
lenient in the peace negotiations. By the end of the war the man in the 
street realized that the British red on the map of Empire was symbolic 
of the blood of British soldiers spilled to defend it. 
CHAPTER III 
SOCIALIST OPPOSITION 
The emergence of popular socialist movements in Britain after 1880 
was l~rgely the result of a growing disillusionment with the old Liberal 
solutions to national problems. Both at home and abroad new develop-
ments had posed questions which the classical liberal philosophy seemed 
unable to answer. A serious economic depression with its attel;lclant un-
employment undermined prosperity. The coercive efforts against the 
Irish, the Egyptian war, and troubles in India and Afghanistan caused 
dissatisfaction among the more radical Liberal leaders. The most ser-
ious $ymptom of this malaise in liberal thought was the beginning of at!'!. 
tacks on free trade. 1 .Part of the reaction to these Liberal failings in 
the post-1880 period was the formation of a number of socialist groups 
that favored .either social reform or social revolution by force. By the 
time of the Boer Wa;, four groups, ranging from evolutionary socialists 
to hard core doctrinaires of Marxist leanings, had grown up and were ex-
pressing opinions on the war. 
The most articulate of these factions was the Fabian Society, 
formed, in 1884. In contrast to the other three socialist groups, the 
Independent Labor Party, the Social Democratic Federation, and the 
lMax Beer,! History .2f British Socialism, Vol. II (London: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd,, 1953), pp. 226-227. 
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Trades Union Congress, the Fabians were not a political party but an 
assodiiation of men and women who were concerned with spreading practical 
views and solutions to immediate and pressing social problems through 
e~ist:ing political institutions. Socialism, they taught, was not a new 
form of society to be accomplished by class struggle but a natural re-
sult of the socia 1 and economic changes that had come about ;I.in the pre .. 
ceding one hundred years. 2 It wu by using pamphlets, lectures, and 
pet it.ions that the Fabians drew attention to the nation's problems and 
offered their solutions. For the first fifteen years of its existence, 
the Fabian Society had conststently avoided taking a position on those 
emotion-packed issues such as Home Rule, church ritual, or foreign af-
fairs .. , feeling that such matters :l;ell outside the real111 of social im-
provement. However, the Boer War was debated throughout the country 
with $uch vigor and intense emotion that the Society was forced by its 
membetship to make a statement on imperial policy. 
ln December, 1899, a meeting of the Society's membership was held 
in hopes that a definite statement could be formulated. At this meeting 
a motion was put forward which would have placed the Society on record 
as condemning the war as being incompatible with "that higher social or-
ganization" which the Society sought to promote.3 An amendment by 
Georg.e Bernard Shaw was much more temperate in tone and described the 
empire as a product of "lofty and public-spirited Imperialism. '14 
Neither the motion nor the amendment passed, but the debate on the 
3A. M. McBriar, Fabian Socialism !!lg. English Politics 1884-1918 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 121. 
4Ibid., p. 122. 
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question revealed that there was a serious division of opinion within 
the Society on the question of the war. 
the Executive Committee canvassed the Society's members by postal 
referendum in February, 1900, with the question, "Are you in favour of 
an official pronouncement being made now by the Fabian Society on J;:m .. 
perialism in relation to the war?'~ By a vote of 259 to 217 the mem-
bership elected not to issue any official statement on imperialism. 
This gave rise to the erroneous assumption that the Fabians were in 
favor of the war. In reality, they had r;nere ly declined to llll3ke any 
statement whatsoever concerning the war for fear a schism in the Society 
would develop. Dtssatisfaction with the results of the poll prompted 
approximately fifteen members to resign from the Society because of 
their strong anti-imperialist feelings. These included several impor-
tant figures: J. Ramsey Macl)onald and J, F. Green of the Executive Com-
mittee; Mrs. J, Ramsey MacDonald; Mrs, Emmeline Pankhurst, the leading 
advocate of women's suffrage; and G. N. Baines and Pete Curran, future 
M.P.s for the Labor Party. 6 After this anti-imperialist element had re-
signed, tb,e Society issued a tract entitled Fabianism and the Empire to 
clarify its position. 
This tract, written by G. :a. Shaw and published ip October, 1900, 
appeated to reinforce the popular notion that the Fabians were favorable 
to the idea of maintaining an empire. The trac:b had been submitted to 
all the Society's members prior to its publication for revision and 
6 Edward R. Pease,~ History of !..h!:. Fabian Society (New York: 
Barnes and Noble Inc., 1963), p. 130. 
6 Ibid., p, 133. 
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therE;1fore represented "the general view of the Society as a whole," 
though it was not binding on any individual member. 7 The preface also 
pointed out that within the Society some members "considered it [the 
war] a political crime and others a justifiable stroke of Imperial 
Statesmanship. 118 Shaw devoted most of this 101-page book to social con-
ditions at home, but also criticized both political parties, the press, 
and the War Office fat' their shortcomings in dealing with the war. 
'In Shaw's opinion, the press w~u responsible for the war, not be .. 
cause of direct control by "financial trading rings" but because of its 
"igno:,:ance and pugnacity. ,.rg Influenced by these newspapers, the govern-
ment's ministers had sent out armed e:x;peditions ostensibly to defend 
flag and empire when in reality the politicbns were being used by the 
financiers "as a ferret is used by a poacher. "l 0 Shaw took both politi-
cal p;:3rties to task for leading the country into war: the Conservatives 
hypocritically profess to be defending democracy, he charged, while the 
Liber~ls give the appearance of opposing democracy by supporting the 
Boers. To Shaw, these arguments based on an appeal to principles were 
immaterial. South Africa, he argued, had "unexpectedly turned out to be 
a gold-reef," and Britain was simply engaged in taking this wealth back 
from the farmers after having relinquished it to them in 1881. 11 In 
Shaw's opinion, the war had produced no effective opposition. The 
7
~ Manchester Guardian, January 30, 1902, p. 9. 
8 George Bernard Shaw, Fabianism !!!§_ ~ Empire: ~ Manifesto ~ 
th,e FEJbian Society (London: Grant Richards, 1900), preface. 
~Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
l,oibid., p. 10. 
llibid., p. 22. 
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British people had witnessed defeat after defeat with such dumb passiv-
ity that ~ Times had been moved to express admiration fo:i; the "forti-
tude and self-control with which the English nation bore humiliation and 
disaster without guillotining the Cabinet in the manner of mere foreign-
ers. ''12 
After flailing both p1;1rties for the lac~ of adequate programs for 
resolving the war, Shaw noted the distressing paralysis of internal re-
form. The status of the franchise, he pointed out, was such that all 
adult women and one-third of the adult males fell outside the legal 
qualification. Shaw s1;1w rampant nepotism throughout th,e Government, 
from the military to the entire diplomatic corps, and denounced the 
House of Commons for promoting "private commercial interests as much as 
any Chamber of Commerce. "13 
After offering these acerbic views on the situation at home, Shaw 
tackled the problem of the Empire more tempe:i;ately by arguing that a 
"Great Power" had the duty to govern in the interests of all civiliza-
tion,il.4 To be sure, there were elements in the world such as gold 
fields and armaments that needed to be internationalized. But the day 
of the world federation did not appear to be at hand. The only realis-
tic substitute for this international sovereign body was acceptance and 
support of "the most responsible Imperial federation available," i.e., 
the B;titish Empire. 15 Of course, any peace settlement would have to 
l- 2 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
i 3 Ibid., P· 60. 
l.4Ibid., p. 23. 
l 5 Ibid., P· 24. 
54 
reflect this trust of civilized society in the British as the protectors 
of common interests. Freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and free .. 
dom of political combination must be guaranteed, and a Representative 
Imperial Council should replace "irresponsible High Commissioners" as a 
sourc,e of appeal on grievances. 16 
By means of this tract, the Fabians offered an ambivalent answer to 
the q.uestion of support or non-support for the war. Shaw portrayed the 
Government as being used to protect the interests of the financial spec-
ulators who controlled the industries o:f South Africa. Simultaneously, 
however, he gave the impression that the empire could be of some benefit 
in wotking for the common good of civilization. But, he argued, it 
would not achieve any great success until a socialist program is in con-
trol of the government. 
Like the Fabians, the trade unions of Britain were divided in their 
attitude toward the war and reflected ;3.n ambiguity of opinion in their 
public pronouncements. Labor policy was formulated in the annual Trades 
Union Congress (T .u .c.), in which delegates representing more than a 
million working men met to consider questions at issue. The Trades 
Union Congress of 1900 passed a resolution condemning the war on the 
grounds that it was a "cruel and unnecessary" war and called for nego-
tiatiQns to end the conflict. 17 In 1901, however, a motion merely to 
open the discussions on the war was defeated by a vote representing 
724,000 constituents to 330,000. 18 The reason advanced for this refusal 
l 16 Ibid., p. 33. 
17Tingfu F. Tsiang, Labor~ Empire (New York: University of 
Columbia Press, 1923), p. 81. 
1 '8 The Manchester Guardian, September 7, 1901, p. 5. 
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to a~t on the war was that such action was outside the purview of the 
Congtess. Taking a stand on foreign policy, it was feared, would turn 
the Congress into a "stalking .. horse for persons interested i,n political 
questions."1 9 
Unlike the Fabians and the T.u.c., the socialist groups to their 
left allowed no ambiguities to intrude into their statements of complete 
opposition to the war and the Government's imperial policy. Their views 
were an amplification of one side of Shaw's work, i.e., that the Govern-
ment was being manipulated behind the scenes by capitalists and finan-
cier$ who were protecting their investments. 
The only workingman's organization that consistently opposed the 
war was the Independent Labor Party (hereafter referred to as the 
I.L.P',) under the leadership of James K,eir Hardie. Hardie was first 
elect,ed to Parliament in 1892 and promptly scandalized that august as-
sembliage by wearing a cloth cap and tweed suit to symbolize his repre-
sentation o,f the working man. He presented a distinct coi;,.trast to 
Joseph Chamberlain, who always wore an orchid in the lapel of his formal 
morning coat while in Parliament. By 1897 Hardie's party was strong 
enough to captU're 38% of the total votes cast in municipal elections 
where I.L.P. candidates were standing. 20 The J.L.P. continually opposed 
the war on the grounds that "it allowed a handful of millionaires to get 
riche;t at the expense of the worki,ngman"2 l. while Great Britain was being 
19Ibid., September 11, 1899, p. 4. 
20 Max Beer,! History of British Socialism, p. 306. 
2l.The Manchester Guardian, November 13, 1901, p. 7. 
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made into a "commercial annex of the United States. ''2 2 
'Xhese socialist groups to the left of the Fabians ma.de no effort to 
form any coalition with the Liberal party because it waa "rotten from 
within"; the only way to achieve their goals, they be1ieved, was to 
"destt!JY the existing Liberal party. ''23 Even within the soci,alist move .. 
ment itself there were factions which refused to cooperate with Hardie 
and other labor leadets, The Social Democratic Federation (S.D.F,), 
formed in 1885 under the leadership of Henry Mayers Hyndman, was a dog-
matic Marxist party which emphasized theory before organization. It was 
total:ly unsuccessful in all its attempts to achieve representation in 
Parliament, The S.D.F. refused to cooperate on a permanent basis with 
other socialist groups largely because Hyndman believed that they were 
not sufficiently committed to a thoroughgoing soci,&list program directed 
against the "Imperial Vampirism" which was suck.ing South Africa dry. 24 
Hyndman, like Hardie, considered the war a plot to increase the capital-
ists' gains at the expense of working men's lives. 
In February, 1900, these four major factions of British socialism, 
S 2 Ibid., April 1, 1902, p. 8. 
23~ Blackburn Labour Journal, August, 1900. This was a particu .. 
larly vitriolic socialist monthly newspaper. During the war its opposi-
tion to government policy was even expressed in some very acerbic verse: 
To Carlyle's Fools 
''There are thirty millions of Englishmen - mostly fools." Carlyle 
Good-morrow, Bulldog Mafficker, seen the 
Budget, eh? 
And you haven't caught De Wet, fah-del .. rah-del 
rey! 
How you stoned and scoffed us with your '~ay, 
Pay, Pay!" 
Now~ grin derisively, Everx Dog!!.!.! Dax! 
24Ibid., June, 1901. 
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the Flabians, the Trades Union Congress, the Independent Labor Party, and 
the S1ocial Democrs.tic Federation, nevertheless combined tempotarily to 
form the Labor Representation Committee, which had evolved by 1906 into 
the Bir"itish Labour Party. Their combination, however, was the product 
of their desire to win seats in parliament for x-epresentatives committed 
to social reforms at home; the war, or foreign policy in general, made 
little or no contribution to this electoral coalition.:a 6 For the Com-
mittee was torn by internal differences over domestic issues, and it was 
even more impossible to reach any agreement on the questions o.f imper-
ialis~ and the war. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the most ori,ginal contribu-
tions to socialist thought occasioned by the war came not from the 
socialists, but from a man with no forma 1 connections with the movement. 
His nam.e was John Atkinson Hobson. When he began his studies on the 
Empire in 1899, the word "imperialism" had a favorable connotation to 
most l3ritons of the time. Larg:ely as a result of his work, the concept 
of imperialism acquired the stnister overtones of exploitation, oppres-
sion, and abuse that have clung to the word to the present day. Hobson 
was an economist, but he recognized the role that ethics and politics 
played in the shaping of economic decisions. He was one of several en-
gaged in the "search after a social ethics" which should harmonize the 
two fields of economics and politics. :as In Hobson' s search for 
,iu:;Elie Halevy, ! History .9!. ~ ~ngliSh People ~~Nineteenth 
Centu:ry, Vol. V: Imperialism and.~~ .9!, Labour (New Yotk: Peter 
Smith, 1951), pp. 263-64. 
26John Atkinson Hobson, Confessions of an Economic Heretic (London: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1938), p. 55. -
58 
confirmation of his ideas, the Boer War ''was both a turning-point ••• and 
an illumination" to his understanding of the relationship between econ-
omics and politics. 2 ' Though no definite position can be assigned to 
him within the ranks of any organi~ed political group, Robson's writings 
refle.ct the socialist conviction that the war was designed to produce 
gains! for the c·apitalists at the cost of the lives of the working popu-
lat ion, 
Hobson' s writings follow an evolutionary process trac·eable in a 
numbet of articles and three books published during the period 1899-
1902. His article on imperialism which appeared in the March, 1899, i.s-
sue o;f Contemporary Review brought an offer from the editor of ~ ~ 
chester Guardian for Hobson to travel to South Africa as a correspondent 
for t:he newspaper. 28 During his stay, Hobson was able to interview 
leade:rs of both sides before the hostilities erupted in October, 1899. 
He returned to England shortly after the outbreak of hostilities and be-
gan his writings. The South African experience, wrote Hobson, ''had two 
effects upon my life. It gave realistic 1;1upport to ec;:onomic opinions 
derived in main from theoretical interpretations of history, and it 
plunged me ••• into the heated atmosphere of political controversy. "29 
A preview of Robson's conclusions appeared in Contemporary Review 
I 
durinB January, 1900. Gold and diamonds were the causes of the South 
African war, he argued, while the grievance.a of the Uitlanders were 
~
7 Ibid., p. 59. 
28 Ibid., p. 60. Hobson mentions this article in his autobiography 
but no such article can be found in any of the 1899 issues of Contempor-
ary Review. 
?Bibid., p. 62. 
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imag:i;nary and were drummed up only to reflect the economic interests of 
the c1apitalists. Then Hobson falls into an anti-Semitic trap by label-
ling the capitalists as not merely "financiers" but always as "Jewish 
financiers." It is this group of international Jewish financiers of 
Conti;nental origins, he explained, who came to South Africa to sink 
"their economic fangs [into] the carcass of their prey, ••so This finan-
cia 1 conspiracy had ;;:ichieved economic control, and it was "the growing 
need of these economic rulers to become political rulers" that had 
caused the war.si 
iaobson argued that there were two policies which could be followed 
when citizens made economic investments outside the political limits of 
their country. On the one hand, investments might be made at the inves-
tor's own risk with no promise of the state intervening to protect the 
investment. On the other hand, harmony between the political and econ-
omic interests might be maintained by a continual expansion of the ter• 
ritory controlled by the state. This latter policy would lead inevitab-
ly to conflict and war with other states which were following the same 
principle. Hobson believed that, in the words of Sir Thomas More, "a 
certain conspiracy of rich men [are J seeking their private advantag:e 
under the name and pretext of the Commonweal. •13 :z 
l.n his book, ~ War in South Africa, Hobson examined the charge 
that a cause of the war was the threat of a Bo.er conspiracy to control 
all of South Africa. Hobson could find no organized desire to expel the 
3°J. A. Hobson, "Capitalism and Imperialism in South Africa,'' .£2!1.:: 
temporary Review, LXXVII (January, 1900), pp. 4-5. 
sirbid., p. 5. 
s '3Ib id. , p. 17. 
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Briti,sh from control in the Cape Colony or the Transvaal. Perhaps it 
was t:rue that the Boers were seeking a loosening of control, he admit--. 
ted, but it was being done by educational and peaceful representation to 
England. There was no justification, Hobson felt, for the actions of 
the British government in the months prior to October, 1899. The ulti-
matum issued by the Boers just prior to hostilities was prompted not by 
any conspiracy on their part but by the increasing threat of British 
arms on her borders after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference. 
Robson's outlook for the future of South Africa was a gloomy one. 
He predicted that guerrilla warfare would prolong the conflict, and the 
ultimate outcome he saw as either "an oligarchy of financial Jews" or "a 
restoration of Boer domination. "3 3 Whatever the outcome, Hobson noted 
that both the British and the Boers had sidestepped the issue of the 
native population which would be a factor in any settlement obtained. 
This book, The ~ !!!. South Africa, was followed by two other volumes 
during the war, ~ Psycholog;x: .2f Jingoism in 1901, and Imperialism in 
1902. In all of his publications during these three years, Hobson ham-
mered at the same points; the war was a result of an inequality in the 
distribution of wealth which left the wealthiest members of society with 
no place to invest their excess capital except overseas, When these in ... 
vestments were threatened, the financiers manipulated the organs of the 
press to bring pressure on the government to save these overseas finan-
cial empires at the cost of the lives of the working population, Hob-
son's writings represent a synthesis of all those arguments against the 
33 J. A. Hob son, The War in South Africa (London: J. Nisbit and 
Company, 1900), p. 310. 
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war which were advanced by the spokesmen of the socialist movement from 
George Bernard Shaw to Hyndman and provided the theoretical and factual 
foundation for Lenirt' s subsequ<i!nt identification of imperialism with the 
final stag;e of capita lism,34 
The socialist groups offered no effective opposition to g.overnment 
imperial policy between 1899-1902 because the:i:;e was a lack of unanimity 
within the socialist ranks and because socialists we:i:;e unwilling to work 
within the existing power structure of the Liberal Farty. The notion 
that imperial policy fell outside the workingman's limits of concern, 
and the ingrained respect and "tug of the forelock" attitude towards the 
aristocracy prevented any group of socialists from bringing pressure to 
bear on the Government. The most significant event for the socialist 
movement during this period was the publication of J. A. Hobson' s 
theories which synthesized socialist thought on imperialism for future 
students and proponents of socialism. 
3 4 Bertram D. Wolfe, Marxism: ~ Hundred Years ill the Life £.!. !:!_ 
poctrine (New York: Dial Press, 1965), p. xix. 
CHAPTER IV 
BRITISH SOCIAL CONSCIENCE IN OPPOSITION 
British imperialism, whatever its motives, had usually been justi-
fied by an appeal to its moral or ethical value. Kipling's poem, ''White 
Man's Burden," is the classic example of this. Even at the height of 
the Boer War the Archbishop of Canterbury declared that it was impera-
tive that Britain evangelize the world; Parliament must give protection 
to those who went out into foreign lands to spread the gospel. 1 This 
Christian imperialism had always been expressly aimed at the heathen 
areas of the world which had as yet been untouched by the teachings of 
Christ and the edifying moral fiber of the British people. The Boer War 
thus presented a prickly situation for the conscience of the nation. 
For the foe in South Africa was not a half-naked, black savage who howl-
ed obeisance to false gods but a white Christian with a Protestant Dutch 
heritage, a heritage with which the British had close ties since the 
seventeenth century. How could the conscientious Englishman find any 
moral justification for a war against a people such as this? 
The proponents of the war were hard pressed to offer a rationaliza-
tion. They argued that even if the Boers were not heathen, they were at 
least guilty of an equally grave sin: that of engaging in the persecu-
tion of innocent ;British miners who we:re seeking to better their 
l.!b.£ Manchester Guardian, October 25, 1901, p. 7. 
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economic status in the Transvaal gold fields. There was something of an 
aura of sanctity in the posses·sion of British citizenship that was 
worthy of defending no matter where the offended citizen was residing. 
In this case, of course, the charges of persecution were of dubious 
validity, since equal voting rights for the British Uitlanders was the 
central theme of the negotiations just prior to the outbreak of hostili-
ties, As is the case of most foreign policy decisions, deciding where 
morality and national interests paxted company was the problem. The 
Conservatives might clearly se(!! where national interests needed defend-
ing, but they would always serve up a goodly portion of moral defense 
for their actions to soothe the troubled conscience of the British elec-
torate. 
·Those who opposed British imperial policy argued that nations, like 
individuals, are equal and capable of behaving morally and rationally. 
Natu:tal harmony should exist between nations; peace should be achieved 
by federation, arbitration, and international law. A line of tradition 
can be traced from Charles Fox's opposition to the French wars through 
John Bright's stand against the Crimean War to the dissenting factions 
of the Boer War. 2 British dissenters were convinced that foreign af-
fairs was a field which abounded in "wicked and persuasive sirens" to 
lead them astray, even though they fervently held to moral ethics in 
thei~ policies.a 
1This outcry of the British social conscience in relation to the 
aoavid A. Martin, Pacifism: An Historical and Sociologi.cal ,Studx 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1966),p. 74~ 
·3Ibid., p. 78. 
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Boer ~ar can be divided into three periods: a pre-war demand for set .. 
tling; the dispute by peaceful means; a period of comparative inactivity 
between October, 1899, and January, 1900, in th.e e:x;pectation that it 
would! be a short war; and the period from the beginning of 1900 to the 
end of the war, during which the dissenters formed into groups specifi-
cally aimed at halting the war. 
There were groups that debated the morality or immorality of the 
war. Those arguing against the war included the "Stop-the•Wa:r;" Commit-
tee, the Transvaal Committee, the National Reform Union, and the South 
Afric,an Conciliation Committee, Both social reformers and labor leaders 
worked in these organizations. The Government, on the other hand, was 
supported by groups like the National Union, the Imperial South Africa 
Association, the South African Vigilance Committee, and the Central Con-
servative Office. All these published pamphlets and conducted meetings 
thro~ghout the war to present their views to the public, 4 
Among the most prominent of the opposition organizations was the 
Transvaal Committee. It was formed in Manchester on September 6, 1899~ 
to "watch the present crisis" and "resist any attempt to drag this 
count;ry into war upon the issue at present before it. ''5 The committee 
dissociated itself from any political party and affirmed that "the prin-
ciples of righteousness and morality" would be its source of guidance in 
the orisis then before the nation. 6 
'The best known member of this humanitarian opposition was the 
4John S, Galbraith, ''The Pamphlet Campaign on the Boer War,"~ 
Journal .2£. Modern History Vol, XXIV, June 1952, p. 112. 
5~ Manchester Guardian, September 6, 1899, p. 5. 
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journ$list and editor, William Thomas Stead. Stead had for many years 
been a close friend of Cecil Rhodes, the British mining magnate in Sout:h 
Africa, but the developing events of the 1890's caused Stead to sever 
the friendship. An enthusiastic supporter of the Hague Conference of 
1898, Stead pledged the rest of his life to keeping the peace through 
the principle of arbitration. He was subjected to considerable abuse by 
the press but doggedly put forth his opinions in his popular Review of 
Reviews. His pamphlet, Shall .. ! Slay !'!X, Brother Boer?, issued in Septem-
ber, 1899, is the best known of the plethora of pamphlets put forth by 
both sides before and during the war. In this pamphlet, Stead denied 
that he was a "peace at any price" partisan or a "eulogist for the 
Boers. "7 Chamberlain and Rhodes had his support at the time of the sup-
posed insurrection in Johannesburg in 1895. Bµt by 1899 Stead felt that 
the Briton had become as "insufferable as the Boer" in his attempt to 
"massacre them [the Boers] into modesty. "8 Stead pledged his utmost to 
arouse public expression to prevent a war which was "impolite, [sic! J 
unnecessary, and unjust.'~ 
.A,ny discussion of virtue or morality in connection with the war 
would naturally evoke responses from the religious element of the soc-
iety. The Churc;:h of England was less willing to take a stand opposing 
the war than the non-conformist churches. Only a month before the war 
began the Archoishop of Canterbury declared that he had not studied the 
controversy enough to permit him to make a statement on the justice and 
7 'Ibid., September 23, 1899, p. 7. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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the oonsequences of a war with the Transvaal.10 However, other members 
of the Anglican clergy were not so hesitant in calling down the wrath of 
God on the heads of the Boers in the name of Great Britain. Reverend 
Arthur Bovins, the rector of the Holy Trinity at Windsor, denounced the 
"crotchety conscience" of the Little Englanders who would "dwarf our 
domiQions everywhere." Merely because Paul Kruger, President of the 
Transvaal, "is on his knees, [he] is not therefore always at his 
prayers," he pointed out .11 Reverend Robins called for Britain to 
"stri;ke for life and honor such a blow as shall make all Boerdom 
reel. "la Another Anglican clergyman, a critic of the war, was disgusted 
by his fellow ministers' lack of opposition. They were, he said, like 
"dumb: dogs that couldn't bark" while standing "in the drawing rooms of 
the great, hand in glove with the men who were clamoring for war. "13 
The non~conforming churches were more united in their opposition and 
called for patience, asking Salisbury and Chamberlain to use their in-
fluence to bring a peaceful conclusion to the crisis. They also laid 
the blame for the crisis on the press, which, in the eyes of non-con-
formist opposition, "appeared bent on hounding the nation" into war . 1 4 
It appea:cs that a clear division on the crisis can be seen between the 
AngUcan Church and the non-conforming churches, but a fear of congrega-
tionail splits persuaded the pulpit to speak for peace for the most part 
lOibid., September 8, 1899, p. 5. 
11 Ibid.' September 7, 1899, p. 5. 
12Ibid. 
13 Ibid., October 5, 1899, p. 8. 
14Ibid., September 12, 1899, p. 5. 
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"in muffled tones. "16 
Public meetings and resolutions by peace groups were the principal 
means of expression for the British social conscience prior to the war. 
The resolutions presented to the leaders were politely pigeonholed, but 
the public meetings were subjected to much more vigorous types of remon-
stration. The largest demonstration opposing the resort to war was held 
on Sunday, September 24, 1899, in Trafalgar Square. Speaker platforms 
were set up on three sides of the monument. All speakers were subjected 
to a torrent of verbal abuse from the crowd in the form of booing, the 
singing of ''Rule Britannia," and the :spirited rendition of various music 
hall favorites. The demonstration was considered a success by w. T. 
Stead, even though "the Devd.l had been allowed ... to come out, head, 
horns, tail and all," and the meeting p-roved "there had never yet been a 
good cause advocated without its being possible for its opponents to ob-
tain a London mob to break up the meeting. "16 
While organizations individually passed resolutions asking for a 
peaceful solution to the crisis, a National Memorial against the War was 
composed to give an opportunity for a nation-wide statement to be 
voiced. It was hoped that this collective effort would have a greater 
effect on the nation's leaders than the smaller groups. The National 
Memorial was published on September 29, 1899, protesting the charges 
that the opposition was hindering the Government's efforts in reaching a 
peaceful settlement and calling for arbitration as affirmed by the Hague 
i 6 Ibid., October 3, 1899, p. 9. 
isrbid., September 26, 1899, p. 7. 
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Conference,1 7 After the war had begun the Memorial was presented to 
Lord Salisbury with 53,833 signatures and the hope that the war would be 
brought to a speedy conclusion. 18 
During the period of oppoeition quietude between October, 1899, and 
January, 1900, the British humanitarians appeared in some strange 
guises. The homeless and jobless Zulus in the war zone were the objects 
for donations sought by the Aborigines' Protection Society.is A letter 
to the editor of the Guardian announced the founding of a l'eace Army 
trained in the use of ambulances, fire brigades, and life-saving duties, 
which would urge arbitration and oppose conscription. 20 
After the beginning of the new year, the humanitarians formed or-
ganizations which were directly aimed at bringing a conclusion to the 
war. The "Stop-the-War" Committee, formed in JanuG1ry, 1900, drew up a 
new memorial calling for a truce and adherence to the Hague Conven-
tion.al The Committee claimed that a number of Anglican clergy had 
signed the memorial, but what astonished the organizers was the number 
of non-ccnformist church members and leaders who had signed. 2 a Emily 
Hobhouse worked with this group to organize the women in protest against 
the war.as The South African Conciliation Committee pledged itself to 
17Ibid,, September 30, 1899, p. 8. 
18Ibid., October 17, 1899, p. 8. 
19 Ibid., February 2, 1900, p. 4. 
ao:bid., October 14, 1899, p. 10. 
a1 ::::bid., January 15, 1900, p. 9. 
aa;.bid •, .;anuary 22, 1900, P· 9 . 
23 Ibid., May 4, 1900, p. 10. 
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keep the public informed of the political situation in the colonies and 
to advocate policies which would establish good will between Britain and 
South Africa. 24 
The war was still condemned as a "disgrace to humanity, civiliza-
tion, and a scandal against Christendom. "26 Replying to the cry of 
patriots for a closing of the ranks in the time of peril, the Guardian 
noted that it was easy to be patriotic "when the war is ••• siK thousand 
miles away, involving not a shadow of a shade of risk to our own island 
or any of us at home. "26 The peace groups called for a truce in the 
middle of March, 1900, because all British territory had been recap-
tured, and any further action would be an invasion of Boer territory. 27 
These organizations did enjoy some local successes as evidenced by 
the experiences of Joseph Chamberlain with the Methodists. He had been 
invited to speak to a Methodist meeting in Manchester on March 2, 1900. 
From February 19 through February 22, fifty-five letters appeared in the 
columns of the Guardian protesting Chamberlain's invitation on the 
gro'..lnds that he was responsible for the war. Chamberlain cancelled hie 
appearance cf February 28 because, as he put it, "a small section of ex-
treme, politicians ••• have Sl!c..ceeded in raising a political agitation 
~1ith1n the Wesleyan Methodist Church, which threatens to disturb its in-
ter:1ial peace."28 
124Ibid., January 17, 1900, p. 3. 
126Ibid., January 13' 1900, p, 9. 
26Ibid., November 13' 1899, P· 7. 
2"'Ibid. , March 13, 1900, p. 4. 
28 Ibid.' February 28, 1900, p. 5. 
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The summer of 1900 was a period of optimism due to the sµccesses of 
the Bl;'itish troops. The Transvaal Committee expressed hope that the war 
was drawing to a close and stated that a peace settlement should be 
based on the independence of the two J;"epublics. The Canadian Union Act 
of 1840 and the United States reconstruction policy towards the post-
Civil War South were cited as examples of how the peace settlement 
should be achieved.as 
1The increase in guerrilla warfare after the ''khaki election" of 
October, 1900, gave the organizations more solid grounds to oppose the 
war. Strong protests against the concentration camps, the farm burn-
ings, and the inadequacies of the medical facilities were initiated by 
these groups. For the remainder of the war these organizations sought 
to promote a settlement which would return the country to the ''high 
moral lines which alone can secure permanence and prosperity," and de-
manded that the two republics be allowed to keep their independence.30 
Eut the Government had refused to entertain this solution from the be-
ginntng of the war. 
The efforts of the peace groups and humanitarian societies were a 
success because they did bring to the public's attention errors in the 
conduct of the war. Suffering caused by poor conditions in the concen-
trat:uon camps, the loss of property by burning, and inadequate medica 1 
treat;,ment for the British soldiers were alleviated due to the efforts of 
thes~ organizations. By the end of the war their campaign had contrib-
uted to a shift of public opinion that was moving more and more away 
89Ibid., June 21, 1900, p. 6. 
aorbid. , May 22, 1901, p. 7. 
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from support of the war. This eroding away of popular support brought 
about a peace settlement that was lenient and acceptable to parties on 
both sides of the war issue. This humanitarian spirit found kindred 
mind$ in the growing socialist and labor groups that were growing more 
powerful politically by the end of the war. The Boer War marked no sig-
nificant change in British pacifism but was simply another milestone in 
a tradition of dissent that can be traced back to the Revolutionary War. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Great Britain has a tradition of solidarity in the face of its 
enemies during periods of national crisis. However, there is also a 
tradition of dissent and opposition in which the British take equal 
pride. This stream of opposition can be traced from the American Revo-
lution to the Boer War. This study has been concerned with the opposi-
tion during the latter. 
The Boer War occurred when Great Britain was at its peak as an im-
peric;1l power. The possession of citizenship in such a majestic dominion 
was the source of greatest pride. But opposition existed at this time 
in Great Britain that permeated the entire strata of society and argued 
against the forceful expansion of this empire. Opposition ranged over a 
wide spectrum of arguments from political to hull).8nitarian in nature. 
Opposition had its basis in the failure to use the principle of arbitt,"a-
tion as establi,.shed by the 1898 Hague Convention; in the inadequate 
training and equipment for the troops; in the lack of fiscal responsi• 
bility by the government; in the supposed economic exploitation of the 
war by the financiers; in the unfair advantages granted to the favorites 
of government officials; in the use of concentration camps to hold Boer 
dependents; and in the demands for an unconditional surrender as the 
0nly terms of settlements. The list of reasons for opposition is long, 
but the test of any opposition is its effectiveness in producing change. 
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The pre-war opposition was totally ineffective in preventing the 
outbteak of hostilities. The Boers' attack on Natal which began the war 
and the hopes for a quick victoty caused the opposition to be sqbdued 
during the first three months of the fighting. But after 1900, as the 
war appeared to be concluded during the "khaki election'' and then slowly 
turned into a guerrilla conflict, the opposition made more telling 
points as the government made mistakes in the conduct of the war, The 
government reaction to all opposition was to wrap itself in the flag and 
to declare that any attacks on it were attacks on the brave boys fight-
ing in South Africa. The opposition produced some concrete results in 
getting conditions improved in the concenttation camps and better medi-
cal facilities for the British troops. The wanton destruction of Boer 
property was also brought under control after the facts were publicized 
by the opposition. The Spion Kop dispatches ultimately resulted in the 
removal of officers from command and finally in Six- Redvers Buller' s 
forced retirement. 
In regard to the peace settlement, the opposition's role ;i.s more 
difficult to discern. It is impossible to point to a specific section 
of the peace treaty and say that this was a direct result of the "Stop-
the-War" Committee or the pamphlets of W. T. Stead. But within a year 
aftet the 1900 election, it was fairly obvious that the public mood had 
chanl?;ed and that the electorate was drifting away from support o·f the 
war. Targets of anti-war agitation in the months after January, 1902, 
included the attacks on the free trade tradition, the rising economic 
and trade might of the United States, and, naturally, the lengthening 
casualty lists. The efforts of the opposition did contribute to a 
general decline in support for the war. As a result, the government 
soft~ned its stand on unconditional surrender and ended the threat of 
bani$hment as a term of the settlement. 
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There is one failure on the part of the opposition in relation to 
the $ettlement that would mar the relations between Britain and South 
Africa from this time forward. Neither the government nor the opposi-
tion made any effort to give the native population of the region any 
rights or role in the government of the area. It is this ignoring of 
the racial situation that would rise to the surface time and time again 
and permanently poison the relations between the South Africans and 
Great Britain. 
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